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Abstract  
 
Workers in precarious employment may have no incentives to support the political system. 
Drawing on the insider-outsider debate, and the populism and party decline literatures, this thesis 
first investigates David Rueda’s claim that workers in precarious employment may have reasons to 
turn against the political establishment (the exclusion hypothesis). Second, it examines whether the 
effect of labor market outsiderness on anti-political establishment attitudes is moderated by the 
ideological distance between the two largest left and right parties with regard to economic and 
cultural issues. As such, this thesis brings together theories of populism and anti-partyism, labor 
market dualization and party competition under the overarching insider-outsider divide framework.  
 
In addition, this thesis pays considerable attention to concept operationalization. The 
dependent variable, anti-establishment attitudes, is treated as a latent predisposition, and computed 
with factor analysis. The independent variable is operationalized as both current employment status 
and occupational unemployment risk, acknowledging the recent debate on outsiderness 
operationalization. I test the hypotheses with survey data from ten European advanced democracies 
in 2014 and find that labor market outsiders, identified by higher exposure to unemployment risk, 
are more likely to endorse anti-establishment attitudes. By contrast, labor market outsiderness 
defined as temporary employment has no effect on the outcome of interest. Finally, I find qualified 
support for the moderating effect of party distance on hypothesis 1: party convergence on the 
cultural dimension is associated with a stronger effect of occupational unemployment risk on anti-
establishment attitudes, while party convergence on the economic dimension is statistically 
insignificant.  
 
Keywords: insider-outsider divide, labor market disadvantage, anti-establishment attitudes, 
party competition, depolarization, factor analysis. 
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  1. Introduction  
 
Workers in precarious employment may have no incentives to support the established 
political system. Low social security benefits, low wages coupled with temporary employment 
contracts characterize an increasing share of workforce, and draw the line between labor market 
outsiders and insiders who enjoy high levels of employment security and benefits. In his influential 
paper on insider-outsider politics in advanced industrial democracies, David Rueda concludes that 
mainstream political parties systematically protect the interests of insiders, and that labor market 
outsiders may have reasons to turn away from mainstream options (Rueda 2005, p.72). This claim 
is referred to as the exclusion hypothesis, following Marx and Picot (2013, p.167).  
 
While often quoted in the insider-outsider politics literature (e.g., Rovny and Rovny 2017, 
Emmenegger et al. 2015, Marx 2014, Marx and Picot 2013), the exclusion hypothesis has only 
been investigated in terms of party choice and participation, rather than political attitudes1. 
Concerned with voting behavior, scholars have rather assumed that outsiders’ opposition towards 
the political establishment should manifest itself as radical right/left party-vote or abstention (e.g., 
Emmenegger et al. 2015, Marx 2014, Marx and Picot 2013). However, given the inconclusive 
results provided by this literature (Rovny and Rovny 2017), the presumed anti-establishment 
sentiment underlying the political preferences of labor market outsiders is worth a closer 
examination.  
 
In this thesis, I approach the exclusion hypothesis from a relatively novel perspective by 
examining the effect of labor market disadvantage on anti-establishment attitudes, treated as a 
latent predisposition. Moreover, I account for the supply-side of the exclusion hypothesis, in that I 
consider the ideological distance between the two largest mainstream parties in a political system as 
a potential moderator factor in the relationship between labor market outsiderness and opposition to 
mainstream politics. In other words, I expect the effect of outsiderness on anti-establishment 
attitudes to be stronger as parties converge on the economic and cultural left-right dimensions, and 
their ideological stances become less distinguishable from one another.  
 
The importance of studying political behavior from both a demand- and a supply-side 
perspective has long been noted by scholars (e.g., Oskarson and Demker 2015), and the insider-
outsider divide provides the theoretical bedrock for joining individual-level and party-level 
                                                 
1
 Although Marx (2014) tests for the effect of labor market outsiderness on political disenchantment, I argue in 
this thesis that his operationalization of political disenchantment is not valid.  
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determinants of political attitudes in a common framework. On the one hand, it allows for 
understanding the micro-foundations of outsiders’ anti-establishment attitudes through both a 
rational choice and non-instrumental filter. Labor market disadvantaged workers have no incentives 
to support mainstream politics, since both right- and left parties are not rationally able to trade-off 
insiders’ social security benefits and high unemployment guarantees for active labor market 
policies that would benefit outsiders’ insertion and mobility on the labor market (Rueda 2005, King 
and Rueda 2008, Lindvall and Rueda 2013). Furthermore, from a non-instrumental perspective on 
political behavior, expressing opposition to a non-responsive political system bears psychological 
rewards (e.g., Marx 2016).  
 
On the other hand, the insider-outsider supplies an endogenous explanation of party strategies 
in industrialized democracies by focusing on voter preferences as the link between economic 
conditions and partisan policy-making (e.g., Rueda 2005). Rather than a mere product of 
exogenous economic forces like technological and product market transformations, the 
segmentation of the labor market became progressively institutionalized, as governments from both 
sides of the political center promoted more flexible, but less secure, types of employment (Palier 
and Thelen 2010, Lindvall and Rueda 2013). The institutionalization of payroll-based welfare 
protection reforms accentuated, in turn, the divide between insiders who could pay for their social 
insurance, and outsiders who were excluded from the normal labor market and whose social 
insurance took the shape of social assistance under state responsibility (Palier and Thelen 2010, 
p.122). Therefore, the conflict of interest between insiders and outsiders is, at least in part, 
maintained by state policy, regardless of political color, and as mainstream left and right parties 
tend to converge on pro-insider policies (Rueda 2005), the effect of labor market disadvantage on 
anti-establishment attitudes may become even stronger. Consequently, by joining demand- and 
supply-side explanations of political attitudes within the insider-outsider divide framework, this 
thesis brings a theoretical contribution to the literature on outsiders’ political behavior where so far 
only individual-level determinants have been considered.  
 
In addition, the exclusion hypothesis is explored in a more nuanced manner by defining anti-
establishment attitudes in the larger context of opposition politics and by placing the concept at the 
intersection between the literature on populism and the debate on the crisis of party. The 
operationalization of the outcome variable as a latent construct is also relatively new in the insider-
outsider literature. Drawing on recent research on populism at the mass level (e.g., Elchardus and 
Spruyt 2016, Akkermann et al. 2014), I employ factor analysis on anti-establishment attitudes 
indicators, a method which yields more valid estimates of the latent trait than individual survey 
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items (Di Stefano et al. 2009) and reduces the measurement error that is typical to survey data 
(Ansolabehere et al. 2008). Moreover, I make use of the latest round of the European Social Survey 
(ESS 7, 2014), which offers enough indicators to construct a more accurate measure of anti-
establishment attitudes (cf. Marx 2014) and to test the exclusion hypothesis in more than one 
country.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis pays special attention to how labor market disadvantage is 
operationalized and acknowledges the theoretical and empirical implications that underlie 
measurement decisions (Rovny and Rovny 2017, Häusermann and Schwander 2013). For 
demonstration and robustness purposes, I operationalize outsiderness as both temporary 
employment and occupational unemployment risk and show that empirical results are sensitive to 
operationalization. Specifically, the hypothesized relationship holds only when outsiderness is 
operationalized as exposure to occupational unemployment risk. As such, this thesis makes an 
additional, albeit modest, empirical contribution to the field of insider-outsider politics by 
illustrating how operationalization matters for the insider-outsider literature, beyond pragmatic 
considerations of data availability.  
 
In a broader sense, this thesis relates to the recent literature on populism and the “party 
decline” debate, in that it aims to answer a somewhat crude, yet pressing question: Why are citizens 
in European advanced industrial democracies, where corruption and political scandals are at a 
relatively low level, and the standards of living are among the highest in the world, becoming more 
and more frustrated with the political establishment? Put differently, what drives the public 
perception that mainstream political parties form an entrenched self-serving elite that has lost touch 
with society (Invernizzi-Accetti & Wolkenstein 2017, p.99)? Documenting the decline in 
partisanship and the increasing rejection of political parties as legitimate representative actors, the 
early literature on anti-partyism has signaled the potential of anti-establishment rhetoric for 
political change (e.g., Gidengil et al. 2001, p.491, Bardi 1996, Scarrow 1996). In a similar vein, 
Kriesi (2007, p.368) has noted the capability of anti-establishment rhetoric to radically transform 
the configurations of Western European politics. In this respect, studying anti-establishment 
rhetoric as latent predispositions among the electorate appears to be the next step in understanding 
the success of outsider parties, as well as the decline of traditional voter-party linkages. Finally, this 
thesis attempts to open the way for future research into the micro-foundations of mass anti-political 
establishment sentiment.  
 
In the next section I specify the concept of anti-establishment attitudes and locate it within the 
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relevant literatures. Although the research questions are derived from the insider-outsider literature 
and play the central role in the analysis, a discussion of what this thesis understands under “anti-
establishment” politics is necessary, since the concept is often confounded with related, but 
different terms such as populism or anti-partyism (Barr 2009). The next two chapters develop the 
theoretical arguments underlying the hypothesized relationship between labor market disadvantage 
and anti-establishment attitudes, and the moderating role of mainstream parties’ convergence. 
Subsequently, I introduce the reader to the various operationalization methods undertaken in the 
empirical analysis and focus on the theoretical and empirical reasons behind each 
operationalization decision. The chapter dedicated to empirical analysis opens with a brief layout of 
research methods, and continues with a discussion of the rationale underpinning the case selection. 
After presenting the three data-sets that the analysis relies on (European Social Survey Round 7, 
Eurostat Labor Force Surveys and Chapel Hill Expert Surveys), I explain how the independent 
predictors are obtained and coded. An important subsection of the analysis chapter consists in 
factor analyzing the indicators for anti-establishment attitudes and in deliberating between different 
methods of factor scores estimation, necessary for generating the dependent variable in the 
subsequent analysis. Additionally, I discuss the choice of the statistical models and present the 
main results. I find that labor market disadvantage operationalized as exposure to occupational 
unemployment is associated with anti-establishment attitudes, while the effect of temporary 
employment is statistically insignificant. The confirmed relationship appears to be stronger when 
the ideological distance between the two mainstream parties decreases with respect to the cultural 
dimension, yet the interaction between party convergence on the economic left-right dimension and 
outsiderness is insignificant. Analysis results and their implications for future research are 
discussed in the final chapter. 
 
 
2. Anti-political establishment attitudes - concept location and specification 
 
The first step in understanding anti-political establishment attitudes is to distinguish the more 
general notion of anti-establishment appeals from similar, yet analytically different, concepts such 
as anti-partyism and populism (Barr 2009). Then, it is necessary to differentiate between anti-
establishment political discourse at the party level, and anti-political establishment attitudes at the 
individual level. Accordingly, the concept of individual anti-political establishment attitudes can be 
located at the intersection between the more recent research on populism and the literature on anti-
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partyism or “the crisis of party” 2.  
 
Attributes such as anti-party (Poguntke 1996, Poguntke and Scarrow 1996, Gidengil et al. 
2001) anti-establishment  (Schedler 1996, Abedi 2002, Barr 2009), and populism (Norris 2005, 
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012) refer to a certain kind of political party or political rhetoric, 
whose raison d’être revolves around the assumption of an implacable schism between the corrupt 
agenda of the established political elites and the “will of the people” (Schedler 1996, pp.292-294, 
Barr 2009, pp.20-31). Despite the terms often being employed interchangeably, Barr (2009, p.29) 
signals the ambiguity surrounding this diverse terminology and the urgency of clarifying the 
concepts of populism, anti-establishment politics, and outsider-politics by investigating the nature, 
the type of voter-party linkages, as well as the locus in the party system, defining these distinct 
expressions of opposition politics.  
 
Inherent to anti-establishment politics are the critique of the entrenched political elites and 
the call for its replacement; on this ground, the term is comparable to what the literature on the 
decline of parties calls anti-partyism or anti-party sentiment (Barr 2009, p.37). However, in contrast 
to anti-partyism, which implies a rejection of traditional governing party alternatives (Belanger 
2004), anti-political establishment discourse entails an additional and explicit “elite vs. the people” 
dimension (Barr 2009, Stanley 2008, Schedler 1996).  
 
According to Barr (2009), the “elite vs. the people” dimension is implied by the type of 
voter-party linkages promoted by anti-political establishment parties: whether plebiscitarian (top 
down, unmediated, direct democracy), or participatory (bottom-up participatory direct democracy)3, 
both representation forms originate from the imagined conflict between the established political 
elite and the people. Furthermore, Barr (2009, pp.38-39) suggests that while anti-establishment 
politics are open to both plebiscitarian and participatory democracy, populism is predominantly 
plebiscitarian. By contrast, Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser (2012, p.153) argue that populism can be 
organized both in top-down and bottom-up fashion. Nevertheless, scholars generally agree that anti-
establishment politics centered on the “elite vs. the people” dimension are a necessary, but non-
sufficient condition for populism, which requires an additional component that is, the idea that 
politics should be the expression of the “general will” of the people, or “people centrism” (Barr 
2009, p.32, Stanley 2008, p.104, Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser 2012, p.150).  
                                                 
2
 The term “crisis of parties”, or “decline of parties”, denotes the crisis of acceptance faced by mainstream 
political parties and refers to unfavorable orientations towards political parties among intellectual or political elites 
and the general public (Invernizzi-Accetti & Wolkenstein 2017, Poguntke 1996, p. 319).  
3
 The explanations of plebiscitarian and participatory linkages come from Barr (2009, pp.37-38).  
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Regarding location, Barr (2009, p.44) emphasizes that not only outsiders i.e., political actors 
gaining prominence outside the traditional party system, but also insiders who aim to alter the 
status quo, frequently employ and benefit from anti-establishment rhetoric, allowing them to appear 
as agents of change. From this follows that anti-establishment appeals are not the domain of a 
single kind of party, e.g., the populist radical right as the common wisdom would imply, but a 
flexible instrument within the reach of any political actor at odds with the established political 
alternatives.  
 
Furthermore, following Schedler (1996a), Barr (2009, p.32) places anti-establishment 
appeals between a loyal kind of opposition against the incumbent government and centered on 
policy issues, and a disloyal kind, levied against the political system per se and its fundamental 
principles. To conclude, anti-establishment political discourse recognizes the legitimacy of the 
political system, but targets its insiders i.e., the mainstream or traditional governing parties, 
drawing its legitimacy from an imagined cleavage between the corrupt agenda of those in power 
and the will of the people. The connections between anti-establishment politics, anti-partyism and 
populism are represented in Figure 1, below. 
Anti-establishment politics have been predominantly studied at the party level, with an 
emphasis on party system features as political opportunity structures for the electoral success of 
anti-establishment and radical right populist parties in Western democracies, particularly the 
erosion of class voting and decreased ideological distance on the left-right dimension (e.g., 
Oskarson and Demker 2015, Loxbo 2014, Spies and Franzmann 2011, Abedi 2002, Ignazi 1996). 
Moreover, a different subfield has focused on the emergence of anti-establishment and anti-
corruption parties in Eastern Europe (Ucen 2007), with authors paying particular attention to 
country level factors such as corruption, unemployment and political instability (Hanley and Sikk 
2016), as well as to the impact of anti-establishment niche parties on the established party system 
(Bågenholm 2013). If the party competition literature has made progress on identifying the 
systemic sources of anti-establishment parties, not much is known about the determinants of anti-
establishment attitudes at the individual level, apart from what can be inferred from the anti-
Figure 1. Anti-establishment attitudes. Concept specification. 
 
Anti-partyism  
Rejection of traditional 
governing parties  
Anti-political  
establishment 
rhetoric 
+People centrism 
Populism 
+ “Elite vs. the people” 
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partyism or populism literature.  
 
This may be a consequence of the conceptual cloudiness characteristic of anti-establishment 
politics, a concept often conflated with anti-partyism and populism (Barr 2009). Another reason for 
the lack of attention to the demand-side of anti-establishment politics may be related to data 
availability. On the one hand, it is difficult to find accurate indicators of anti-establishment attitudes 
and to empirically distinguish them from related concepts such as political distrust, anti-partyism or 
populism. On the other hand, cross-country surveys directly measuring disenchantment with 
mainstream politics are even harder to find. While questions tapping into political trust are 
commonly asked throughout the seven rounds of the European Social Survey, to date only the ESS 
Round 7 (2014/2015) provides additional variables needed for measuring anti-establishment 
attitudes in a cross-country analysis. This thesis exploits this unique dataset (ESS 7) and aims to 
contribute to the anti-establishment politics literature by exploring sources of anti-establishment 
attitudes among the electorates of Western European democracies. Nonetheless, the resulting 
operationalization of anti-establishment attitudes is bound to imperfection, due to the imprecise 
language of the available indicators. This issue is discussed in detail in the chapter dedicated to 
operationalization.  
 
Scholars have argued that anti-establishment politics can be a powerful force for political 
change (Gidengil et al. 2001, p.491, Bardi 1996, Scarrow 1996). This type of rhetoric, directed at 
traditional governing alternatives, is not exclusively the domain of radical right parties, but may be 
appropriated by any politician who wishes to present themselves as an agent of change (Barr 2009, 
cf. Hanley and Sikk 2016). Therefore, studying the emergence of anti-establishment politics at both 
the party- and the individual level is necessary if the adjacent literatures on populism and party 
decline are to make progress in understanding the variation in manifestations of public discontent 
with mainstream politics, which may be related, but conceptually and empirically unique.  
 
 
3. Insights from labor market dualization and the insider-outsider divide  
 
The main research task of this thesis is to investigate the effect of labor market disadvantage 
(outsiderness) on anti-political establishment attitudes. This expectation is first and foremost based 
in recent research on the electoral consequences of insider-outsider politics in industrialized 
democracies (Rueda 2005, King and Rueda 2008, Lindvall and Rueda 2013, Marx 2014, 
Emmenegger et al. 2015). Associated with unemployment risk, lower wages, fewer benefits, and 
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low social security, an outsider position in the labor market is likely to lead to anti-political system 
attitudes, as outsiders have no incentives to support a political system that does not represent them 
(Rueda 2005, King and Rueda 2008). However, the often-cited remark that labor market outsiders 
are more likely to oppose mainstream politics has only been investigated to a limited extent, with 
radical left or radical right party choice and abstention proxying for anti-establishment attitudes 
(e.g., Rovny and Rovny 2017, Emmenegger et al. 2016, Marx 2014). Besides, studies of outsiders’ 
party preferences remain inconclusive, yielding different results depending on how labor market 
outsiderness is operationalized (Rovny and Rovny 2017). Thus, to date, it is still unclear how the 
insider-outsider divide translates into political preferences and attitudes towards mainstream 
parties.   
 
For these reasons, I suggest examining the exclusion hypothesis in terms of attitudes towards 
the political system, instead of voting choice. Moreover, I argue that the insider-outsider divide is 
an under-researched, yet useful theory for integrating both individual and party-system 
determinants of political attitudes into a common framework. Theoretically, a common framework 
makes sense when considering the political nature of labor market dualization (Palen and Thelen, 
2010), as well as the representation dilemma challenging traditional mass left parties (Rueda and 
Lindvall 2013).  
 
According to dual labor market theory and the labor market segmentation literature 
(Davidsson and Naczyk 2009), the working class is divided between workers with higher wages, 
employment stability and security, benefits and career advancement opportunity, as well as higher 
pensions, and workers with lower wages, prone to either longer unemployment spells, or to atypical 
employment, with less training and less job stability, and fewer advancement opportunities (Piore 
1975, in Davidsson and Naczyk 2009, p.7). These two categories belong to different labor market 
segments, with different functioning logics and rules, and with low chances of worker mobility 
between the two segments (Reich et al. 1973, in Davidsson and Naczyk 2009, p.7).  
 
There are several explanations for dualization, ranging from a strictly economic perspective, 
which posits that firms adjust their strategies in response to market change and uncertainty, aiming 
to reduce labor turnover costs in tight labor markets, to political accounts, which consider the 
dualization of the working class a mean to control the labor process (Palier and Thelen 2010, p. 
120). Most importantly however, is the finding that, rather than a cyclical phenomenon in which 
dualization strategies are sensitive to changes in unemployment and market competition, labor 
market segmentation has been progressively institutionalized and underwritten by state policy over 
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the past few decades (Marx 2016, Palier and Thelen 2010, p.120, also Rueda 2005). Therefore, the 
disaggregation of the working class into insiders and outsiders is at least partially, a direct 
consequence of party politics. 
 
Related to what Rueda and Lindvall (2013) call a representation dilemma, scholars have 
argued that insiders and outsiders have fundamentally distinct economic interests, with the former 
valuing job security, and the latter benefitting more from labor market entrance opportunities and 
unemployment benefits (e.g., Rueda 2005, p.62). Given that the share of insiders is greater than that 
of outsiders, but also because outsiders participate less in politics (Verba et al. 1995, in 
Emmenegger et al. 2015, Rueda 2005, p.62, Lindvall and Rueda 2013), traditional labor or social-
democratic parties tend to prioritize the interests of insiders (Rueda 2005, Palier and Thelen 2010, 
Lindvall and Rueda 2013). In addition, in spatial voting models an increase of labor market 
flexibility at the expense of less insider employment protection and benefits is politically infeasible 
even for left parties, due to insider-outsider conflict of interest and the disproportionate distribution 
of insiders and outsiders across the labor force (Saint-Paul et al. 1996, in Davidsson and Naczyk 
2009, p.28). The alternative labor parties are left with is to liberalize atypical employment, allowing 
outsiders to enter the job market more easily, but without the social benefits of insiders (Marx 
2016, p.203, Davidsson and Naczyk 2009, p.28). In a similar vein, Rueda (2005, 2007) argued that 
social-democratic parties are bound to their core constituency (insiders), causing them to only 
promote marginal pro-outsider reforms that do not go against insider interests.  
 
Consequently, the insider-outsider divide influences political behavior via the risks and 
disadvantages related to one’s type of employment and occupation, but also due to underlying party 
politics and policy decisions. In particular, outsiders are more likely to oppose mainstream politics, 
since traditional party alternatives neglect their economic interests. This expectation is underpinned 
by both rational choice and non-instrumental assumptions (Marx 2014, p.140). On the one hand, 
outsiders may oppose mainstream politics (King and Rueda 2008, p.293), to pressure traditional 
parties into more responsiveness (Emmenegger et al. 2015, p.194). On the other hand, rather than a 
rational choice, opposing the established political parties can be an expressive act, psychologically 
rewarding in itself (Emmenegger et al. 2015, p.194). Both abstaining and voting for an anti-
establishment party can fulfill the need to express one’s resentment and mistrust towards the 
political system (Marx 2014, p.140). Put differently, opposition towards mainstream politics is the 
manifestation of increasing political alienation among disadvantaged workers (King and Rueda 
2008, p.292).  
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To date, there have been only a few attempts to study outsiderness in relation to political 
behavior variables other than party choice or welfare preferences. A notable exception is the work 
of Emmenegger et al. (2015, p.208), in which the authors find that the relationship between labor 
market disadvantage and radical party vote or abstention is mediated by the respondent’s level of 
external efficacy, while internal efficacy has no significant effect. While arguably context 
dependent (The Netherlands), these findings demonstrate the indirect effect of outsiderness on 
voting behavior, making it worthwhile for scholars to focus more on latent political variables, as 
necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for political behavior.  
 
Another relevant study is Marx’s (2014) analysis of the effects of temporary employment on 
political preferences and attitudes in Europe: contrary to insider-outsider theory, temporary 
employees are not significantly more likely to defect from social democracy, nor to show signs of 
disenchantment with mainstream politics. Instead, they are more likely to support the new left 
(Marx 2014, p. 150). Measured as “Satisfaction with how democracy works” and “Trust in political 
parties”, it is however not surprising that the author found no relationship between outsiderness and 
political disenchantment, since, as scholars have argued, many democracies have experienced a 
general and gradual erosion of institutional trust and confidence in political parties among the 
public - thus, political trust is  less suited a concept to explain the prevalent variation in political 
attitudes and behavior among citizens of advanced democracies (Norris 2005, p. 164).  
 
In conclusion, labor market dualization theory and the insider-outsider debate provide 
substantial grounds for the expectation that labor market outsiders are more likely to endorse anti-
political establishment attitudes. This expectation represents the main research question of this 
thesis, expressed in hypothesis 1: 
 
H1: Labor market outsiders are more likely to endorse anti-establishment attitudes.  
 
Moreover, the consequences of outsiderness on political attitudes may be moderated by 
changes in the party system, such as depolarization on important policy issues, providing outsiders 
with incentives to oppose mainstream politics. The next chapter addresses this expectation in detail.   
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3.1. Insights from the literature on party competition/ party polarization 
 
The second hypothesis of this thesis expects the relationship between outsiderness and anti-
political establishment attitudes to be moderated by the degree of mainstream parties’ convergence 
on the economic and cultural conflict dimensions. This argument is based on the premise that the 
quality of party competition, i.e., the degree of ideological differentiation among political parties in 
a system (Sartori 1976), shapes electoral behavior by structuring choice (Evans and Tilley 2012, 
Dalton 2008).  
 
Drawing on spatial models of party competition (Downs 1957), an influential line of 
research within the comparative political economy and party competition literatures has argued that 
party positioning on the Left and Right axis is influenced by both centrifugal and centripetal forces, 
which in turn affect voting behavior (e.g., Dalton 2008, Cox 1990, Sartori 1976). Competing for the 
median voter, political actors adopt relatively extreme policies under centrifugal forces, producing 
an ideologically polarized system, whereas under centripetal forces, they tend to promote centrist 
policies, converging to the center of the left-right axis (Cox 1990, Dalton 2008). Both scenarios can 
lead to voters’ political alienation and abstention if voters perceive that their nearest party has 
moved too far away from their preferred policy position, and alternatively, if voters are at an equal 
distance from two or more party alternatives (Dalton 2008, p. 901). Moreover, both party system 
polarization and mainstream party convergence have been independently theorized as opportunity 
structures for the electoral success of challenger parties (Meguid 2008, Kitschelt 2007, cf. Ignazi 
1993). In a similar vein, Kirchheimer’s “catch-all” thesis states that, as parties adjust their position 
instrumentally, based on the position of competitors and the median voter, meaningful opposition 
diminishes, policy appeals are less precise, and constituencies become more volatile (Kirchheimer 
1966 in Williams 2008, p. 106, Mair 2008).  
 
From this perspective, it is reasonable to expect party convergence to enhance anti-political 
establishment attitudes, as they prohibit voters from differentiating among political offers. 
Counterfactually, polarization should decrease the probability of outsiders opposing mainstream 
politics, insofar as polarization heightens the social identity effects of partisanship (Lupu 2014, 
p.335). However, other scholars have argued that party system polarization transmits a lack of elite 
consensus, and indirectly creates an opportunity structure for challenger parties to exploit non-
politicized issues such as immigration, morality and national pride and gather votes from those 
critical of mainstream politics (Arzheimer and Carter 2006, p.424, Ignazi 1996, p.559). From this 
perspective, outsiders, who are generally underrepresented by mainstream politics (Rueda 2005, 
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Rueda and Lindvall 2013), could perceive polarization as elites’ unwillingness or inability to 
promote the policies that matter to them. To sum up, the lesson is that party competition acts as a 
strong supply-side predictor of political behavior, with significant effects on the erosion of party-
voter linkages (Elff 2007, Evans and Tilley 2012, Rennwald and Evans 2014, Gingrich and 
Häusermann 2015).  
 
Before launching into a more detailed discussion of the underlying theoretical framework, a 
word on the question of ideological convergence is needed. In a recent and prominent volume on 
the politics of advanced democracies, Beramendi et al. (2015) argue that, contrary to common 
wisdom, mainstream left and right parties have not converged to neoliberal economic policies, and 
demonstrate that there is still considerable variation among the different types of capitalism in 
Western Europe. Particularly, the chapter by Kitschelt and Rehm (2015) sets out to examine the 
sources of partisan alignments by comparing three competing explanations with different 
expectations about party system configuration patterns: on one hand, postindustrial realignment 
predicts durable partisanship effects, while dealignment and cartel party detachment predict 
convergence. While, Kitschelt and Rehm’s (2015) analysis is very sound, including 18 industrial 
democracies and accounting for three different polarization measures, their final statement is rather 
strong for the evidence they manage to produce. In fact, Kitschelt and Rehm’s (2015) results reveal 
considerable cross-country heterogeneity with regard to polarization4, but no overall trend towards 
polarization or convergence.  
 
This thesis acknowledges the variance in ideological polarization between mainstream parties 
in Western Europe and exploits it to assess its eventual effects on voter attitudes. I do not assume 
that parties have converged toward the center, nor that they are polarized, yet I build on an 
extensive strand of literature recording shifts of major left and right parties towards the center of 
the Left and Right axis and their independent effects on voting behavior (Evans et al. 1995, Evans 
and Tilley 2012, Rennwald and Evans 2014, Gingrich and Häusermann 2015). A quick review of 
the literature on party competition and dealignment reveals a handful of examples: the infamous 
shift to the right of Blair’s New Labor in Britain (Evans et al. 1999, Evans and Tilley 2012), the 
move to the center of social democracy on social investment (Rueda and Lindvall 2013), the 
weakening of left-right polarization in Western European advanced democracies (Hobolt and Tilley 
                                                 
4
A constituency-based measurement yields: 6 countries experience a significant downward trend in polarization; 
nine experience a significant upward trend; three experience no trend; A perception-based measurement yields: 4 
countries with a downward trend in polarization, two with in an upward trend and four with no trend; An expert-based 
measurement yields: 3 countries experience significant upward trends in polarization, three experience significant 
downward trends and seven experienced no trends. Note: the number of countries included in the analysis differs from 
measurement to measurement, due to constraints in data availability (Kitschelt and Rehm 2015). 
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2016, Rennwald and Evans 2014 Oskarson and Demker 2015 on the Swedish party system, Adams 
et al. 2012 on the Dutch party system). In a similar vein the welfare state literature notes a 
rightward shift on welfare issues in Liberal regimes, a narrowing of partisan differences around a 
pro-welfare equilibrium in Continental Europe, and general support for welfare spending across the 
entire political spectrum in Social Democratic countries (Gingrich and Häusermann 2015). 
Although they explicitly argue against the convergence thesis, Beramendi et al. nevertheless find an 
irregular trend of convergence towards the liberalization of temporary employment (2015, p. 11), 
thus corroborating previous findings from the labor market dualization literature (e.g., Rueda 
2005).  
 
Returning to the party competition literature, scholars disagree as to what ideological 
dimension matters more when it comes to linking mainstream parties’ issue positioning and 
challenger parties’ electoral success (Spies and Franzmann 2011). If the economic left-right 
dimension has long been considered as the most important cleavage line (Kitschelt 2007, Abedi 
2002), more recent research has stressed the relevance of the cultural dimension when investigating 
radical right parties’ opportunity structures (Loxbo 2014, Karreth et al. 2013, Spies and Franzmann 
2011). Moreover, economic and cultural conflict lines matter for the formation of political 
preferences and mobilization, reinforcing each other (Kriesi et Häusermann 2015, Kitschelt and 
Rehm 2015, Kriesi et al. 2006). Consequently, I expect that party distance will influence the 
relationship between labor market disadvantage and anti-establishment attitudes with regard to both 
an economic and cultural dimension of party competition.  
 
A few studies have so far investigated the link between party competition (convergence vs. 
polarization) and several dependent variables more or less connected to what this thesis calls “anti-
political establishment attitudes”. Opinions against the established political parties, labeled as anti-
partyism, have been examined in British and Canadian elections (Webb 1996, Gidengil et al. 2001), 
whereas studies concerned with voting for challenger parties such as anti-immigration or radical 
right parties are more prolific (Loxbo 2014, Karreth et al. 2013, Bélanger 2004, Norris 2005, Abedi 
2002). While both strands of literature agree that the radical right vote is related to anti-political 
establishment attitudes, there have been to my best knowledge no attempts to explain anti-political 
establishment attitudes from both a demand- and supply-side perspective. In the remainder of this 
section I review the studies this thesis builds on, even though they do not explicitly deal with anti-
political establishment attitudes.  
  
In an examination of correlates of anti-partyism in Britain, Webb (1996) finds that a lack of 
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perceived difference between parties is strongly correlated with hostility and/or indifference 
towards the party system. Additionally, the impact of social background characteristics, apart from 
unemployment, is generally weak. In a similar study of the 1997 Canadian election, Gidengil et al. 
(2001) analyze the covariates of anti-party sentiment and find that attitudes against the party system 
are strongly influenced by political sophistication and most of all by issue alienation. In contrast to 
Webb (1996), perceptions of convergence between the main party alternatives are not statistically 
significant (Gidengil 2001, p. 500).  
 
Hobolt and Tilley (2016) examine voting patterns in the aftermath of the Euro crisis and find 
support for the “establishment punishment” explanation, according to which, the convergence of 
mainstream left and right parties on austerity and fiscal policy-making guidelines of the EU has led 
people affected by the crisis to defect from the mainstream political party alternatives. Citizens 
experiencing economic hardship did not merely punish the incumbent government, but all 
mainstream parties who during the crisis whose cues on economic issues, Europe and immigration 
ere perceived as very similar (Hobolt and Tilley 2012, p. 986).  
 
Another strand of literature explores the effects of mainstream party convergence on the 
opening of political opportunity structures for anti-establishment parties. Abedi (2002) examines 
the relationship between party competition and voting intention for anti-establishment parties both 
at single election points and overtime and finds support for the thesis that anti-establishment parties 
thrive in party systems where the distance between the mainstream party alternatives is smaller. 
This finding is corroborated by Adams et al.’s (2012) study of the Dutch party system, where 
depolarization between the two major political parties on the traditional Left-Right dimension has 
created incentives for challenger parties to mobilize new cultural issues. Furthermore, Oskarson 
and Demker (2015) explain the realignment pattern behind the radical right party, Sweden 
Democrats, as a function of both an eroded linkage between the working class and their traditional 
representatives, the Social Democratic Party, and the tendency towards depolarization between the 
two main parties (Social Democrats and Moderates).  
 
Karreth et al.  (2013, p.815) examine the consequences of “catch-all” strategies adopted by 
social democratic parties in Germany, Sweden, and Great Britain over time and find that moving 
towards the political center causes de- and realignment of core voters in the long run, while the gain 
in new voters is short lived, hence causing a destabilization of the party system and undermining 
themselves as functional political organisations. Loxbo (2014) finds similar results, when testing 
the effect of perceived party convergence in the fields of economic distribution and immigration 
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policy. In a least similar case study of Swedish voters’ support for the radical right Sweden 
Democrats (SD), the analysis yields somewhat contrasting results: while perceived convergence on 
economic-distributive issues actually seems to reduce short-term support for SD, it is the perception 
that the mainstream parties converge on immigration policy that is more likely to increase support 
for SD (Loxbo 2014).  
 
To conclude, party competition constitutes the supply-side of anti-establishment attitudes’ 
determinants, and is hypothesized to moderate the effect of labor market disadvantage. This 
expectation leads to the second hypothesis examined in this thesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Labor market outsiders are more likely to endorse anti-establishment attitudes 
when the distance between the main left and right parties decreases with regard to the economic 
dimension.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: Labor market outsiders Outsiders are more likely to endorse anti-
establishment attitudes when the distance between the main left and right parties decreases with 
regard to the cultural dimension.  
 
 
4. Concept operationalization 
 
In this section I discuss the operationalization of the dependent variable, as well as the 
operationalization of the individual- and country-level independent variables, with a focus on 
theoretical implications and limitations of each operationalization choice. 
 
4.1. The dependent variable 
 
Following recent attempts to measure populism at the mass level (Elchardus and Spruyt 2016, 
Akkerman et al. 2014, Hawkins et al. 2012), I operationalize anti-political establishment attitudes 
as a latent, unobserved, variable, approximated by a series of indicators tapping into the “elite vs. 
the people” dimension and the anti-partyism dimension (Figure 2). Taking into account Goertz’s 
(2006) recommendations for concept specification, I also discuss the negative pole of the dependent 
variable and the continuum between the two. Anti-establishment attitudes are then thought as a 
continuous latent variable in direct antithesis with partisanship. In between, there are milder 
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manifestations of anti-political establishment attitudes or of declining partisanship, such as general 
political distrust, party switching and ticket-splitting5.  
 
 
Figure 2. Indicators of anti-political establishment attitudes (ESS 7) 
Elite vs. the people How much does the political system allow for people like you to have a say in what 
the government does?  
How much does the political system allow for people like you to have an influence 
on politics? 
How easy do you personally find it to take part in politics? 
Anti-partyism How much politicians care about what people like you think? 
 
 The selection of the anti-partyism is motivated by the anti-partyism and populism literatures, 
which employ similar variables to measure anti-party sentiment (e.g., Parties don’t care what 
ordinary people think in Gidengil 2001, p.498 and Belanger 2004, p.1062). However, an 
unavoidable limitation of this operationalization is the impossibility to distinguish between specific 
and general anti-partyism i.e., between the rejection of the established parties and the rejection of 
political parties in general. This caveat has previously been noted by the literature on party decline 
(Poguntke 1996, Poguntke and Scarrow 1996, Gidengil et al. 2001). Belanger (2004) 
operationalizes specific anti-party sentiment as negative ratings given to the two established-party 
alternatives, yet this option is not available in ESS 7 (2014/2015). Gidengil et al. (2001, p.494) 
argue however that, when respondents report that politicians do not care about what ordinary 
people think, they could just refering to traditional party alternatives, rather than parties per se. 
Given that ESS 7 (2014/2015) asks whether politicians, and not parties, care about what people 
think, I believe it is reasonable to assume that respondents actually answered with the established 
political elite in mind, rather than the nature of political parties.  
 
Likewise, the indicators of the “elite vs. the people” dimension are less desirable measures of 
anti-elitism. Ideally, this dimension would be proxied by variables asking respondents directly if 
they thought that the differences between the elite and ordinary people are larger than the 
differences among the people (Akkerman et al. 2014, p.1333) or if they agreed that ministers 
should spend less time behind their desks and more among the ordinary people (Elchardus and 
                                                 
5
 Political distrust is a general, prevalent attitude in democratic institutions, yet it is not equivalent to anti-
establishment attitudes (Norris 2005). Party switching and ticket-splitting are associated with the erosion of 
partisanship and traditional voter-party linkages (Dassonneville 2016).  
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Spruyt 2016, p.121). To my best knowledge, such precise questions are not available in any cross-
country survey, although they are sometimes asked national surveys such as in the studies cited 
above. Ultimately, I assume the trade-off between a single-country study with better indicators and 
a cross-country analysis with less desirable indicators, which makes it possible to understand the 
relationship of interest in a wider context and to account for cross-country variance. Additionally, I 
argue that the variables provided by ESS7 are good enough indicators of the anti-establishment 
stance, because they accentuate the distance between the political system and ordinary people via 
expressions such as “people like you” and “personally”. Finally, the results obtained with this 
imperfect operationalization of anti-political establishment attitudes should serve as a motivation to 
incorporate both specific and general measures of anti-partyism and anti-political elitism into cross-
national surveys, given their importance for understanding voting behavior and opposition politics 
at the mass level.  
 
4.2. Individual-level independent variables 
 
Labor-market disadvantage, or outsiderness, is hypothesized as a demand-side source of anti-
political establishment attitudes and operationalized as both temporary work (limited or no 
contract) and occupational unemployment risk. Therefore, the first research question will be tested 
with two different independent variables. This decision is motivated by the prevailing disagreement 
in the labor market dualization literature with regard to how the insider-outsider divide should best 
be operationationalized (Häusermann and Schwander 2013, Rovny and Rovny 2017). It is true that 
the strand of political economy research that has revived the debate on the insider-outsider divide, 
has initially conceptualized outsiders as temporary workers and/or the involuntarily unemployed, 
with low social security, low salaries and employment precariousness (Rueda 2005, p.62, Rueda 
2014, p.384, cf. Emmenegger et al. 2015, p.193, Marx 2016). Yet Häusermann and Schwander 
(2013, p.251) argue that temporary contracts and/or involuntary unemployment are too ephemeral 
socio-economic characteristics to have a stable impact on political preferences and mobilization, 
thus questioning their relevance as labor market disadvantage proxies for political behavior 
research.  
 
What Häusermann and Schwander (2013, p.251) propose instead, is an outsiderness measure 
based on labor market risk derived from an individual’s occupational class, which is arguably a 
more stable characteristic, since people may change from unemployment to employment within a 
few months, [...], but they do not change their occupational class quickly. Häusermann and 
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Schwander’s (2013) occupation-based operationalization of outsiderness is comparable to Rehm’s 
(2009, 2011) operationalization of labor market disadvantage as occupational unemployment risk, 
yet it differs in that it explicitly accounts for gender and age as determinants of outsiderness, 
besides occupational class. Both approaches stress the importance of occupational class as a locus 
of political preference formation, based on a mechanism of generalization and transposition of 
work-related private experiences to policy preferences (Kitschelt and Rehm 2011, p.1674). Put 
differently, and assuming that the work place is at the center of adult social networks, people are 
more likely to be concerned with rising unemployment within their occupational branch, because 
the probability that they know someone affected or threatened by unemployment is higher (Rehm 
2009, p.861).  
 
Choosing between different operationalization-methods is not just a matter of preference or 
data availability; it is much more a matter of theoretical reasoning, with consequences for empirical 
results6. As Häusermann and Schwander (2013, p.251) have argued, temporary unemployment and 
temporary working contracts may be less informative for researchers interested in political 
preferences than for those preoccupied with labor market processes. Nevertheless, Marx (2016, 
p.104) makes the point that, while temporary work may be just a stepping stone in someone’s 
career, only a small share of the workforce actually makes a successful transition to stable 
employment. From this perspective, temporary employment or involuntary unemployment informs 
voters’ rational expectations about their chances for better economic prospects (Emmenegger et al. 
2015, p.193, Marx 2016, p.104). Drawing on the economic voting literature, employment status can 
be seen as the pocketbook rule of economic evaluations, which expects voters to rationally evaluate 
the economy based on their personal economic situation, and to punish or reward politicians 
accordingly (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007, p.519). By contrast, occupational unemployment 
risk can function as a sociotropic voting rule by forming voters’ perceptions of the national 
economy.  
 
Given the equal weight of each argument, I follow Rovny and Rovny (2017) in 
operationalizing outsiderness as both temporary employment and occupational unemployment 
risks, which the authors parsimoniously categorize as status-based and occupation-based 
outsiderness measures. More specifically, I restrict the group of status-outsiders to those 
                                                 
6
 Rovny and Rovny (2017, p.15) demonstrate that outsiderness leads to different vote choices, depending on 
operationalization procedures: operationalized as employment status (temporary, part-time, unemployed), outsiderness 
increases the likelihood of voting for the radical left and decreases the likelihood of voting for the radical right. By 
contrast, when operationalized as occupational unemployment risk (both accounting and not accounting for gender and 
age), outsiderness decreases the likelihood of radical-left party choice, and increases that of voting for the radical right.  
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respondents in temporary employment, which is frequently involuntary and legally characterized by 
low employment security relative to full-time workers (Marx 2016, p.100). Occupation-outsiders 
are those respondents with an occupation characterized by high unemployment risk. Following 
Rehm (2009), I approximate unemployment risk exposure per occupation by occupational 
unemployment rates. I explain how I calculated these rates in the subsequent chapter, where I 
discuss the independent variables and their coding sources.  
 
Furthermore, employing both measures of labor market disadvantage serves as a robustness 
check for the first hypothesis. If an occupation-based operationalization is arguably more 
interesting for political behavior, it is nonetheless prone to aggregation bias. Because I cannot 
measure occupational unemployment risk directly at the individual level, I must infer it from 
aggregate data, which makes it possible to assign individuals a risk that may actually never 
manifest (Häusermann and Schwander 2013, p.251, Rovny and Rovny 2017). By contrast, status-
outsiderness is measured at the individual-level as limited or no employment contract. Finally, the 
distinction between status- and occupation-based labor market disadvantage potentially bears 
different theoretical implications for the demand-side source of anti-political establishment 
attitudes, and thus makes it worthwhile to explore the first research question with both 
outsiderness-measures.  
 
4.3. Country-level dependent variables 
 
The ideological distance between the two-main left and right parties in a political system is 
theorized as one possible supply-side source of anti-political establishment attitudes. In line with 
the party competition literature, I account for both the economic-distributive, as well as for the non-
material cultural dimensions of conflict, and measure party converge as the distance between the 
two-main left and right parties in a political system. The economic dimension refers to the classic 
question of resource allocation and redistribution (Beramendi et al. 2015, Loxbo 2014, Kitschelt 
2007), while the cultural dimension is represented by the general GAL/TAN7 cleavage. 
 
I am aware that, by restraining the operationalization of the country-level independent 
variable to the distance between only the two largest parties is a coarse approximation of 
mainstream politics convergence, with obvious shortcomings when it comes to systems 
                                                 
7
The new politics dimension ranging from Green/Alternative/Libertarian (GAL) to 
Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist (TAN) (Hooghe et al. 2002).  
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characterized by a proportional representation formula. Yet, limiting the number of parties to the 
main traditional left and right parties is not uncommon for case studies on party competition in 
proportional representation systems (e.g., Oskarson and Demker 2015 in the case of Sweden, 
Adams et al. 2012 in the case of the Netherlands). In fact, this thesis follows Spies and 
Franzmann’s (2011) two criteria for identifying mainstream left and right parties in both a 
majoritarian and proportional representation system: the share of votes (or seats) in a given national 
election, and the location of the two parties with respect to one another on the left-right axis. 
 
 
5. Research design - brief presentation 
 
Before hypothesis testing, I conduct a factor analysis on the indicators of anti-political 
establishment attitudes, to demonstrate that the selected variables can be considered as 
manifestations of the same latent construct. Then, I generate the predicted factor score underlying 
the four indicators of anti-establishment attitudes and employ it as the dependent variable for 
subsequent regression analyses. For robustness checks I run the main models with three factor 
scores calculated after different methods. The second and main analysis part models the effect of 
labor market outsiderness on anti-establishment attitudes in a series of ordinary least squares 
regressions with heteroscedastic standard error and survey weights. The third part investigates 
whether party distance has a moderating effect on the relationship between outsiderness and the 
outcome variable. The motivations and reasoning behind each research design choice are discussed 
in greater detail in the subsequent chapters. The analysis is conducted in STATA 14.2 and the null 
hypotheses that the estimated slope coefficients are equal to zero are rejected at the standard 
significance level of 0.05.  
 
5.1. Case selection 
 
The universe of cases consists of ten Western European democracies: Austria, Denmark, 
Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. The 
case selection is first and foremost informed by the literature, but also partly limited by data 
availability. Following Beramendi et al. (2015, p.5), a first selection criterion is related to 
institutional stability and integrity, necessary to hold constant potential country-level confounders 
such as systemic corruption, variability of the rule of law and citizens’ compliance with 
institutional rules, hence the study of advanced industrial democracies. Because the dependent 
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variable is measured with the European Social Survey 7 (2014), the analysis is limited to European 
countries. Second, the two Southern European countries available in the ESS 7, Spain and Portugal, 
are excluded since the involvement of the European Union in budgetary policies, and the austerity 
and privatisation measures that followed (Otjes and Katsanidou 2017), can be expected to be the 
main source of citizens’ anti-establishment attitudes, rather than the insider-outsider divide.  
 
Finally, the universe of cases excludes Central and Eastern European countries, where party 
systems are less institutionalized, less legitimate in the eyes of the public, and are still to develop 
stable societal connections (Kriesi 2014, p.374). For these reasons, the claim that outsiders are 
more likely to oppose mainstream politics partly because social democratic or labor parties fail to 
fulfil their traditional role of protecting labor interests does not apply to Central and Eastern Europe 
because the party-voter linkages in these polities did not go through a solidification period, in the 
sense of Lipset and Rokkan’s thesis (1967) after the fall of Communism. As such, the emergence of 
anti-establishment parties in Central and Eastern Europe is not as much related to representation, 
but to corruption and government performance (Kriesi 2014, p.374).  
 
5.2. Data 
 
The analysis is based on the European Social Survey Round 7 2014/2015 (ESS7), the EU 
Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS) and the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES 1999-2014, 2014). ESS7 
(2014/2015) is an academically-driven survey administered in over 30 countries which monitors 
attitudes and values, containing a series of European social indicators. ESS7 provides the ideal set 
of individual level variables required by this thesis, namely questions which can together proxy for 
specific anti-political establishment attitudes, as well as socio-structural predictors and control 
variables for alternative explanations. To date, ESS 7 (2014/2015) is the only cross-national survey 
measuring attitudes against the political establishment8, which makes the analysis dependent on this 
survey and thus limited to a one-point in time cross-national comparison. Finally, the ESS7 
(2014/2015) includes population, design and poststratification weights, which I account for 
according to the ESS documentation at hand9. 
 
The EU-LFS is the largest European household sample survey providing quarterly and annual 
                                                 
8 The European Values Survey (combined with the World Values Survey) includes several questions which could 
successfully proxy for anti-political establishment attitudes, however I could not use it because those variables had no 
observations.   
9 https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS_weighting_data_1.pdf (last accessed 5.04.2017). 
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data on labor participation and unemployment, which are necessary for computing occupational 
unemployment rates and generating the individual-level independent variable. Based on expert 
evaluations, the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (1999-2014 and 2014) estimate party positioning on a 
large set of policy issues for national parties in several European countries, including the economic 
left-right and the cultural dimensions, and keep track of recent party formations and their 
categorization into party families. Both data files are used in order to generate the country-level 
independent variable.  
 
The coding of the dependent variable, anti-establishment attitudes, is presented in detail in the 
factor analysis section. In the remainder of this section I only discuss the coding decisions behind 
the independent predictors, including control variables and alternative predictors.  
 
5.2.1. Individual-level predictors  
 
The independent variables are occupation-based outsiderness and status-based outsiderness, 
following the main demarcation line between the most common conceptualizations of labor market 
disadvantage, as suggested by Rovny and Rovny (2017). Status-based outsiderness is proxied by a 
dichotomous variable from the ESS7 survey, in which respondents with temporary and no work 
contracts are coded as outsiders, and respondents with unlimited work contracts as insiders.  
 
 The variable occupation-based outsiderness was computed according to the specifications 
given by Rehm (2009) and Rovny and Rovny (2017). First, I computed Rehm’s (2009) formula10 of 
occupational unemployment rates by country for the year 201311 and for the main nine occupations 
according to the International Standard Classification of Occupation ISCO08, excluding the armed 
forces due to data unavailability. The values plugged in the formula come from the following 
annual EU-LFS series: Employment by occupation (lfsa_egais) and Previous occupation of the 
unemployed (lfsa_ugpis) (available in the Appendix).  
 
Rehm’s (2009) measurement of outsiderness is a binary variable, with the national average of 
occupational unemployment as the cut-off value between insiders and outsiders. However, this 
                                                 
10 Occupational unemployment rate = [Nr. of unemployed in occupation j/ Nr.of unemployed in occupation j + Nr. of 
employed in occupation j] x 100.  
11 Since I hypothesize that respondents exposed to unemployment risk in their occupational line are more likely to 
endorse anti-establishment attitudes, I deem it appropriate to compute these risks for the year prior to ESS7(2014/2015) 
because I assume that there is a lagged effect of actual unemployment on respondents’ perception of unemployment 
risk.  
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arbitrary cut-off value can be misleading for countries with very high unemployment rates and very 
high means, as well as for cases where occupations with unemployment rates just below the mean 
are relegated to the category of insiders, leading to considerable information loss. In order to 
improve the quality of the independent variable, I generate a continuous variable capturing the 
corresponding unemployment rate for each occupation, by country. In other words, each respondent 
of the ESS7 (2014/2015) survey is assigned an unemployment rate based on his occupation and 
country of origin, calculated with Rehm’s formula. As Häuserman and Schwander (2013, p.252) 
emphasize, a continuous measure of occupation-based outsiderness is superior to a binary measure 
in that it accounts for the variability in unemployment rates across groups, which can ultimately be 
interpreted as “degrees of outsiderness”12.  
 
Each model contains a battery of socio-structural variables that are common for analyses of 
political attitudes: age13, gender, education14, income15, union-membership and migrant status 
(Marx 2014, p.142, Norris 2005 p.153). According to Häuserman and Schwander (2013), women 
and young people under 40 are more prone to labor market vulnerability, and thus expected to score 
higher on the anti-political establishment attitudes scale. By contrast, a higher income, a higher 
education level, as well as union membership stand for labor market advantage, and so are 
hypothesized to decrease one’s likelihood of endorsing anti-establishment attitudes. In contrast, 
non-unionized workers are more likely to endorse anti-political establishment attitudes because, on 
one hand they face employment precariousness to a higher extent than insiders (King and Rueda 
2008, p.279), and on the other they rely more heavily on economic evaluations when forming 
political opinions (Marx 2016, p.101). Finally, a dummy variable recording migrant status is 
necessary, since migrant workers may be overrepresented in temporary jobs, and thus in the 
outsiders group (Marx 2014, p.143).  
 
Alternative explanations of anti-political establishment attitudes are accounted for by adding 
control variables deemed relevant by the adjacent populism and anti-partyism literatures. First, as 
Norris (2005, p. 161) argues, citizens’ anti-establishment attitudes could be driven by support of 
populist radical right parties. The ESS7 (2014/2015) asks respondents to choose the political party 
                                                 
12 In contrast to the measure of outsiderness employed in this thesis, Häusermann and Schwander’s (2013, p.254) 
continuous measure is based on the difference between the workforce average and the group-specific rate of atypical 
and unemployment rate, with groups being defined based on occupation, sex and gender.  
13 Recoded into a dummy variable: 0 ”People under 40” 1 ”People older than 40”, because in most Western European 
countries a “substantial share of people in their 30s must still be counted as labor market entrants” Häusermann and 
Schwander (2013, p.253). 
14 Education is measured on 7 levels: Less than lower secondary, Lower secondary, Lower tier upper secondary, Upper 
tier upper secondary, Advanced vocational, Lower tertiary, Higher tertiary.  
15 Income is measured on 10 deciles. 
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they feel particularly close to from a closed list of both mainstream and niche parties in each 
country. In order to measure radical right support, I generated a dummy variable for every 
respondent reporting they were feeling close to any radical right party. The radical right parties 
were selected based on the CHES (1999-2014) dataset, for the year 2014 (see Appendix).  
 
Second, as Marx (2014) suggests, post-materialist value orientations may have an impact on 
party choice and political preferences, and therefore can be hypothesized to influence anti-political 
establishment attitudes. I have chosen three variables asking respondents if a) a country’s cultural 
life is undermined or enriched by immigrants, b) if gays and lesbians should be free to live as they 
wish, and c) if the European unification should go further or has gone too far. Disagreement with 
the first two statements, as well as answering that the EU project has gone too far, may tap into 
radical right attitudes and thus are expected to increase a respondent’s score on the anti-
establishment attitudes scale. The three questions are representative of the new transformed post-
materialist conflict dimensions (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015), although they may also capture a 
salience component, whose indirect effect I am unable to isolate in this analysis and which should 
be considered when interpreting the coefficients of these three variables in the regression results.   
 
Other potential sources of anti-establishment attitudes accounted for are dissatisfaction with 
the national government and political mistrust which can stem either from a dose of “normal” 
criticism (Loxbo 2014, Oskarson and Demker 2013), or from disappointment that the preferred 
party is not in government (Norris 2005). Additionally, I include a measure of satisfaction with the 
economy in order to control away the effects of sociotropic evaluations of the economy on political 
attitudes (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007).  
 
5.2.2. Country-level predictors 
 
The ideological distance between the two-main left and right parties in each of the countries 
included in the analysis is the difference of the estimated party positions on the economic left-right, 
GALTAN and immigration policy dimensions. The two-main left and right parties were identified 
by their vote share in the national election most prior to 2014 in CHES (1999-2014) and the policy 
positions for each party were identified in the CHES (2014)16. In the CHES datafiles parties’ policy 
positions take on non-integer values ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). 
                                                 
16 The reason for not using only CHES (1999-2014) is that data for Switzerland is available only in CHES (2014). 
Information about the two Swiss biggest parties in 2014 was obtained from: 
https://www.parlament.ch/de/%C3%BCber-das-parlament/archiv/archiv-fraktionen (last accessed 4.26.2017).  
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Consequently, party distance variables range from either 0 (when the distance between parties is 
non-existent) to 10 (when the distance is absolute). 
 
Because I am interested in the effect of narrower party positions, I reversed the sense of the 
variables from min->max, to max->min, and rescaled them so that max = 0 (absolute divergence) 
and min = 1 (absolute convergence), which simplifies the interpretation of the interaction effects. 
Each party distance variable can take on any (non-integer) value between 0 and 1, which makes it 
possible to treat them as continuous predictors. Figure 3 displays the policy dimensions included in 
the analysis with their corresponding party distance variable.  
 
 
 
5.3. Factor Analysis  
 
In line with more recent research on political attitudes and values (Elchardus and Spruyt 
2016, Akkerman et al. 2014, Ansolabehere et al. 2008), I construct a scale of anti-establishment 
attitudes by employing factor analysis, a method often used in psychology and education sciences 
to capture dimensions or predispositions that are directly unobservable e.g., intelligence, abilities, 
happiness. As Ansolabehere et al. (2008) emphasized, constructing a scale with factor analysis is a 
far better method of capturing political opinions than the commonly employed individual survey 
items because it reduces the unavoidable measurement error that is characteristic to survey data18.   
 
Therefore, anti-establishment attitudes are theorized in this thesis as a latent predisposition, 
unobservable, but measurable as a linear composite of the indicators selected from the ESS 7 
(Salkind 2010). The first step is then to investigate whether the observable indicators are 
endogenously determined by an underlying latent construct tapping specific anti-political 
establishment attitudes. However, a potential measurement caveat is related to the concept of 
                                                 
17 Green/Alternative/Libertarian–Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist  
18
 More precisely, the measurement error is reduced at a rate equal to 1/k, where k is the number of items included in 
the scale.  
Figure 3. Ideological distance between the two-main left-right parties and corresponding 
variables.  
pid_LRecon Ideological distance on the general economic left-right dimension. 
pid_GALTAN Ideological distance on the GAL/TAN dimension17.  
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political trust, which is expected to highly correlate with anti-political establishment attitudes, and 
yet to be independent from it, as suggested by Norris (2005) or Oskarson and Demker (2015). 
Hence, construct validity depends on empirically distinguishing between anti-political 
establishment attitudes and its correlates such as political distrust.  
 
Fortunately, the ESS7 (2014/2015) provides a wide array of variables capturing different 
concepts of political attitudes, including both political trust and anti-establishment feelings (Figure 
4). Using confirmatory factor analysis, I examine if the covariance structure of these manifest 
variables is determined by different but correlated latent factors, and then extract the factor 
measuring only specific anti-political establishment attitudes for further hypothesis testing.  
 
Figure 4. Recoded variables tapping specific anti-political establishment attitudes (1-4) and 
political trust (5-6), followed by their value labels. 
xnoinflgov Political system does not allow people to have a say in what the government does. 
xnoinflpol Political system does not allow people like you to have an influence on politics. 
xpolitnocare Politicians don’t care what people like you think. 
xhardpartpol How hard is it for you to take part in politics? 
xnotrustparties No confidence in political parties. 
xnotrustpolit  No trust in politicians. 
All items have been formulated in reverse of the original statement.  
 
Factor analysis refers to a set of statistical methods employed to establish the number of 
distinct constructs accounting for the pattern of correlations among observable variables19 in a 
given dataset (Fabrigar and Wegener 2011, p.4). When the number of common factors and the 
specific measures each common factor is supposed to determine are defined a priori by the 
researcher, then Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is appropriate (Fabrigar and Wegener 2011, 
Salkind 2010, Harrington 2008). Factor analysis partitions the observed variance of a manifest 
variable into a common variance, accounted for by the common factor (communality), and a unique 
variance, unaccounted for by the common factor, and consisting of a specific variance and an error 
variance (Fabrigar and Wegener 2011, p.7). Put differently, CFA provides information about the 
structure of correlations among manifest variables, i.e. common factors, as well as estimates of the 
influence of each common factor exerted on each of the observed variable, i.e. factor loadings, and 
                                                 
19
 I employ the terms manifest variables, observable variables and indicators interchangeably.  
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uniqueness scores for each item (Fabrigar and Wegener 2011, p.4). Therefore, CFA is particularly 
useful for construct validation and for construct development, such as a scale of anti-political 
establishment attitudes.  
 
Regarding data characteristics, all indicator variables have a high number of categories (0 to 
10) and each has a value of 0 recording when a respondent does not agree at all with the statement, 
which allows for the data to be treated as interval, i.e., the distance between categories to be 
considered equal (Harrington 2010). However, it is possible to compute factor analysis for binary, 
continuous and ordinal data by obtaining factor solutions from a polychoric correlation matrix, 
relaxing the continuous and multivariate assumption imposed by the default Pearson’s correlation 
matrix20. According to Holgado-Tello et al. (2010, p.165), factor analysis of ordinal data based on 
polychoric correlations reproduces the measurement model better and results in more robust 
factors. Furthermore, the number of non-missing observations is considerably large (18974), thus 
alleviating any sample-size concerns (Herrington 2010).  
 
The first factor analysis yields one factor with an eigenvalue of 3.41, accounting for 0.98 of 
the variance and all variables have a uniqueness score lower than 0.42, except for the variable 
measuring how easy it is to participate in politics xhardpartpol. For simpler structure, I implement 
two commonly employed rotation solutions (Harrington 2010): oblique/ varimax and 
orthogonal/promax. After the varimax rotation, the variable loadings on each factor suggest that the 
first factor mainly determines the variables related to anti-political establishment attitudes, while 
the second factor underlies variables measuring political trust. This finding strengthens the 
argument for analytical differentiation between the concepts of political trust and anti-political 
establishment attitudes.  
 
Nevertheless, even if conceptually distinct, it does make sense to assume that anti-political 
establishment attitudes and political distrust correlate with one another. This can be easily checked 
with the promax option and the estat common matrix, yielding a correlation coefficient of .67 
between the two factors. The variables xnoinflgov, xnoinflpol, xpolitnocare and xhardpartpol load 
higher than the generally accepted lower bound of .45 (Akkerman et al. 2014, p.1332) on the first 
factor, with eigenvalue 3.41, and accounting for 0.84 of the total variance. Next, I specify the CFA 
model by including only the anti-establishment items (rotation: varimax) and retain the factor with 
the largest eigenvalue (2.15). The factor loadings for each item, the eigenvalue of the retained 
factor and scale reliability index are displayed in Figure 5.  
                                                 
20  www.stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/faq (last accessed 6.04.2017). 
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Figure 5: Scale properties of items tapping anti-political establishment attitudes of ESS7 
respondents.  
Anti-political establishment attitudes 
Cronbach’s alpha=0.83 
Eigenvalue=2.15 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy=0.79 
Factor Determinacy Coefficient=0.90221 
Factor Loading22 
  
Uniqueness 
Political system does not allow people to have a say in what 
government does.  
0.76 0.42 
Political system does not allow people like you to have an 
influence on politics. 
0.83 0.32 
Politicians do not care what people like you think. 0.73 0.39 
It is hard for you personally to participate in politics. 0.60 0.64 
chi2(6) =3.0e+04, p>chi2=0.0000 
 
Based on the retained factor solution (Figure 5), I generate three factor score estimates based 
on three different methods that will serve as proxies for latent variables in the subsequent analysis, 
representing the scores that would have been observed for a person if it had been possible to 
measure the factor directly (Brown 2015, p.31). The literature on factor analysis generally 
distinguishes between coarse and refined methods for factor score computation (DiStefano et al. 
2009, Grice 2001). Coarse factor estimates are obtained by averaging the sum of the factor 
indicators, and standardization and weighting are also common practices (DiStefano et al. 2009). In 
contrast, refined factor scores are linear combinations of the observed indicators, and their 
computation requires complex statistical procedures that account for both the shared variance 
between the items and the common factor, as well as the error term variance that is unique to each 
item and unmeasurable (DiStefano et al. 2009).  
 
While coarse factor scores are more easily interpretable and less dependent on the estimation 
sample, refined factor scores are considered in the factor analysis literature superior estimates of the 
underlying latent construct, yielding unbiased and highly correlated estimates of the true factor 
score (Brown 2015, Salkind 2010, DiStefano et al. 2009, Grice 2001). Furthermore, refined factor 
estimates can be computed using ordinary least squares regression which predicts the location of 
each respondent on the underlying factor by standardizing and weighing the observed indicators by 
                                                 
21Obtained after installing the command FSDET in Stata 14.2 (Author: Mehmet Mehmetoglu, Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology). 
22After oblique rotation.  
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their regression coefficients, also accounting for the correlation among observed variables 
(DiStefano et al.2009). Another common factor prediction method is Bartlett’s approach which is 
similar to the multivariate OLS approach described above, but produces unbiased estimates of the 
true factor scores by using maximum likelihood estimation (DiStefano et al. 2009). Nevertheless, 
the choice of estimation method unavoidably involves a trade-off between validity and correlational 
accuracy (Salkind 2010, DiStefano et al. 2009, Grice 2001). Therefore, this thesis employs three 
different factor score estimates as robustness checks for subsequent regression models.  
 
Based on Figure 5, I generate a coarse factor estimate equal to the sum of each indicator 
weighted by its factor score coefficient obtained with an OLS regression. The literature on factor 
analysis considers this coarse factor estimation procedure to be superior to other methods such as 
averaged sums or weighting by factor-loadings, insofar as it yields higher levels of validity and 
correlational accuracy (Salkind 2010, Grice 2001). Then I generate two refined factor scores using 
OLS regression, which maximizes validity, and the Bartlett approach, which maximizes 
correlational accuracy (gives unbiased estimates). Due to space constraints, I only present results 
obtained with the OLS factor score as the dependent variable, but replicated results with the other 
two coarse and refined scores are available in the Appendix.  
 
Figure 6 shows the total and cross-country distribution of the factor score, anti-establishment 
attitudes, which will serve as the dependent variable in the subsequent analysis. This distribution 
can be compared to that of the coarse factor score (Figure 6a) and to the Bartlett score (Figure 6b). 
From Figure 6 one can see that the values of the factor score are distributed continuously with 
values closer to 10 representing higher scores on the anti-political establishment scale23.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 The dependent variable takes on positive non-integer values ranging from 0 to 10.77105; N=20,242; Missing 
values=1,072.  
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Figure 6. Histograms of refined factor score (OLS method) proxying for anti-establishment attitudes by country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the histogram labeled “Total” in the right downward corner of Figure 6 one can see that 
the factor score values tend to cluster towards the right of the x-axis, with the mean at 6.4, showing 
a general tendency towards anti-establishment attitudes among respondents – visible in the 
relatively high intercepts in the subsequent regression models. There is also interesting variation at 
the country level. In Austria, France, Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom the distributions of 
the factor score are negatively-skewed, showing a tendency towards anti-establishment attitudes, as 
compared to Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Denmark or Switzerland. This indicates 
unobserved country-level heterogeneity, which is of course to be expected even for this small 
sample of Western industrialized democracies, with different institutional patterns, political 
systems, welfare regimes and economies. Additionally, the presence of outliers towards the end of 
the x-axis may raise concerns that the variable is not normally distributed and thus inappropriate for 
linear regression. However, for large samples (N=20,242), parameter estimation would still be valid 
and the distribution of the t statistic would approximate correctly even without the normality 
assumption holding (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2011, p.17). 
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6. Testing Hypothesis 1: Are labor market outsiders more likely to endorse anti-establishment 
attitudes?  
 
The continuous nature of the refined factor score proxying for anti-establishment attitudes 
suggests that linear regression is an appropriate method for testing hypothesis 1. As indicated by 
Figure 6, the data appears to be clustered by country and hence the error terms may be correlated 
with one another at the country level, which would violate the independence assumption of 
ordinary least square regression and lead to underestimated standard errors and overestimated test 
statistics, increasing the possibility to falsely reject the null hypothesis (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 
2011). Multilevel analysis, modeling both individual and country-level effects, would be the ideal 
option for cross-country data if the number of clusters were higher. Although some scholars still 
approve the use of multilevel analysis when the number of level-2 groups is as low as 10 (e.g., 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2011, p.159), recent research has demonstrated that multilevel models 
based on maximum likelihood estimation underestimates standard errors and causes the same Type-
1 problem as ordinary regression even with 20 or more level-2 clusters (Stegmueller 2013, p.749). 
However, as Huang (2016, p.178) points out, not every clustered dataset requires multilevel 
modeling. Instead, a design-based approach which accounts for sampling design features such as 
clustering and stratification by computing standard errors using the TS linearization variance 
estimation method is more desirable (Huang 2016, p.179, Hahs-Vaughn et al. 2011). In addition, an 
ordinary least square regression with dummies for clusters can be used to keep group-level 
heterogeneity constant (Huang 2016).  
 
A design-based approach can easily be implemented in Stata 14.2 by adjusting the dataset for 
survey analysis and using the prefix svy before regression commands. I first generate a new weight 
variable equal to the product of the design and population weight variables24 available in ESS 7 
(2014), as recommended in the ESS 7 Data weighting guide (2014) for cross-country analyses. 
Then I declare the new weight as a probability weight in the svyset command in Stata 14.2, together 
with the primary sampling unit (idno) and strata (country)25. The standard errors returned by 
regression commands prefixed by svy are computed with TS linearization methods, as 
recommended by Huang (2016). 
 
Hypothesis 1 is first tested with the status-based operationalization of labor market 
                                                 
24
 Design weights correct for sample selection bias (individuals have different probabilities of being selected 
into the sample) and population size weights correct for the variance in the population size across countries, ensuring 
that each country is represented in proportion to its population size (ESS 7 Documentation 2014).  
25
 ESS 7 (2014) Data Protocol.  
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disadvantage, which is a dummy variable recording the type of employment contract (Model 1), as 
well as with the occupation-based outsiderness (Model 2). Each model includes socio-demographic 
characteristics, and additional control variables for alternative explanations of anti-establishment 
attitudes are subsequently included in Models 2a and 2b. Model 3 keeps country effects constant. 
The results are presented in Table 1. For robustness checks, Table 1a in the Appendix replicates 
Model 3 with the coarse factor score and the Bartlett score as dependent variables (Models 3a and 
3b). 
 
Table 1. Ordinary Least Square Regressions with Linearized Standard Errors and Probability Weights Added 
 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 2b Model 3 
Scores for anti-political establishment attitudes (refined factor score) 
Status-based Outsiderness 
 (contract type) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
    
Occupation-based outsiderness  
(occupational unemployment 
risk) 
 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
Female 0.21*** 
(0.05) 
0.17*** 
(0.05) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
0.13*** 
(0.05) 
0.13*** 
(0.05) 
Age (younger than 40) -0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
   
Age (continuous)  0.01** 
(0.00) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Education (EISCED) 
Lower secondary  
(Base category: Less than lower 
secondary) 
-0.51*** 
(0.11) 
-0.50*** 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
Lower tier upper secondary -0.30** 
(0.10) 
-0.27** 
(0.10) 
0.14 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
Upper tier upper secondary -0.73*** 
(0.12) 
-0.65*** 
(0.11) 
-0.36*** 
(0.09) 
-0.30*** 
(0.08) 
-0.30*** 
(0.08) 
Advanced vocational -0.77*** 
(0.11) 
-0.65*** 
(0.10) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.21** 
(0.08) 
-0.28*** 
(0.08) 
Lower tertiary -1.28*** 
(0.12) 
-1.17*** 
(0.11) 
-0.46*** 
(0.10) 
-0.44*** 
(0.09) 
-0.46*** 
(0.09) 
Higher tertiary -1.41*** 
(0.12) 
-1.24*** 
(0.11) 
-0.57*** 
(0.10) 
-0.60*** 
(0.09) 
-0.65*** 
(0.09) 
Income in deciles 
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2d Income decile  
(Base category: 1st Income decile) 
0.13 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
0.06 
(0.10) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
0.10 
(0.09) 
3d Income decile  
 
-0.05 
(0.12) 
-0.09 
(0.11) 
0.14 
(0.10) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
4th Income decile  
 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.15 
(0.12) 
0.05 
(0.10) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
5th Income decile  
 
-0.24 
(0.12) 
-0.24* 
(0.12) 
-0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.05 
(0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.09) 
6th Income decile 
 
-0.25* 
(0.12) 
-0.24* 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.09) 
7th Income decile  
 
-0.37** 
(0.12) 
-0.38*** 
(0.11) 
-0.06 
(0.10) 
-0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
8th Income decile  -0.41*** 
(0.12) 
-0.42*** 
(0.12) 
-0.04 
(0.10) 
-0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
9th Income decile -0.63*** 
(0.13) 
-0.60*** 
(0.12) 
-0.19 
(0.10) 
-0.14 
(0.09) 
-0.16 
(0.09) 
10th decile -0.89*** 
(0.13) 
-0.80*** 
(0.12) 
-0.27** 
(0.10) 
-0.26** 
(0.09) 
-0.27** 
(0.09) 
Migrant status -0.22* 
(0.09) 
-0.23** 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
0.19** 
(0.06) 
0.21** 
(0.06) 
Non-union membership  0.41*** 
(0.06) 
0.43*** 
(0.06) 
0.32*** 
(0.05) 
0.17*** 
(0.04) 
0.10* 
(0.05) 
Feeling close to a radical right 
party 
0.38*** 
(0.09) 
0.38*** 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
  
Disagreement: Gays and lesbians 
free to live life as they wish 
  0.06 
(0.04) 
  
Country’s cultural life 
undermined by immigration 
  0.28*** 
(0.03) 
0.19*** 
(0.02) 
0.20*** 
(0.02) 
  EU unification already gone too 
far 
  0.26*** 
(0.03) 
0.15*** 
(0.02) 
0.17** 
(0.02)* 
Dissatisfaction with the national 
government 
  0.87*** 
(0.03) 
0.36*** 
(0.03) 
0.35*** 
(0.03) 
Dissatisfaction with the national 
economy 
  0.32*** 
(0.03) 
0.18*** 
(0.03) 
0.21*** 
(0.03) 
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Distrust in political parties    0.46*** 
(0.01) 
0.44*** 
(0.01) 
Country fixed effects No No No No Yes 
Constant 7.40*** 
(0.13) 
7.09*** 
(0.13) 
3.32*** 
(0.14) 
2.25*** 
(0.13) 
2.60*** 
(0.15) 
Observations 14133 15849 15080 15017 15017 
R2 0.095 0.092 0.355 0.494 0.505 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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6.1. Results  
 
From Model 1 it follows that status-based labor market disadvantage has no significant effect 
of anti-establishment attitudes, whereas Models 2, 2a, 2b and 3 show that occupation-based 
outsiderness has a positive and statistically significant effect on the outcome variable. While the 
size of the estimated coefficient decreases from 0.06 to 0.03 as more predictors are added to the 
equation, the corresponding p-values are consistently below 0.01. In Model 3, when all 
demographic characteristics, alternative explanations, and country effects are controlled for, a one 
unit increase in occupational unemployment risk (occupation-outsiderness) is associated with a 
0.03 increase in the anti-establishment score, with certainty estimated between 0.01 and 0.5. The 
returned R-squared is 0.50, which indicates that Model 3 with the entire set of predictors and 
country fixed effects accounts for roughly half of the variation in anti-establishment attitudes.  
 
Figure 7. Predicted probability of endorsing anti-establishment attitudes (fitted after Model 3) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fact that the two variables intended to measure labor market outsiderness do not have the 
same expected effects corroborates previous research emphasizing the importance of 
operationalization in the insider-outsider literature (Rovny and Rovny 2017, Schwander and 
Häusermann 2013). Particularly, Schwander and Häusermann (2013, p.251) argue that status-based 
operationalizations are less suitable when investigating political behavior, given that employment-
status and type of contract are too ephemeral conditions to have a stable impact on political 
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behavior and preferences. From this perspective, an insignificant effect of status-based outsiderness 
on anti-political establishment attitudes could suggest that individuals do not form their opinions 
towards the political establishment based on their employment contracts. By contrast, the 
significant effect of occupation-defined outsiderness indicate that voters’ evaluations of the 
political system are partly determined by their relative position in the labor market and the 
unemployment risk associated with their occupational sector. Relative to the economic voting 
literature, this finding can be interpreted as evidence for the sociotropic voting rule.  
 
Across all models 1-3, the effects of socio-demographic predictors are, in general, as 
expected: women are significantly more likely to oppose the political system as compared to men, 
which is not surprising considering that women are more often than men in a disadvantaged labor 
market position (Häusermann and Schwander 2013). Moving from a lower to a higher educational 
category, as well as from a lower to a higher income decile gradually decreases the likelihood of 
endorsing anti-establishment attitudes, holding all other variables constant. Moreover, respondents 
who do not belong to a union are significantly more likely to score high on the outcome variable, a 
plausible consequence of lower social benefits and lower unemployment protection associated with 
non-unionized jobs (Marx 2014). Likewise, respondents born outside the country of residence are 
significantly more likely to oppose the political system, which could be an effect of migrants being 
overrepresented in temporary jobs (Marx 2014), hence with higher unemployment risks. Finally, 
contrary to previous expectations the effect of age truncated at the cut value of 40 years is not 
significant, yet replacing the dichotomous variable with a continuous age variable in Model 2b 
yields a significant and positive effect of age, suggesting that older people are more likely to 
endorse anti-establishment attitudes.  
 
Testing for alternative explanations reveals several surprising findings: first, feeling close to a 
populist radical right party has no significant effect on anti-establishment attitudes once controls for 
values and satisfaction with the government and the economy are included. Second, disagreement 
with the statement that lesbian and gay persons should be free to live as they want has no 
significant effect on the outcome variable either. However, the variables measuring negative 
attitudes towards immigration and EU integration both have significant and positive effects on the 
dependent variable, corroborating previous research on the importance of value orientation for 
political behavior (Karlsen and Aardal 2016, Leimgrubber 2011, Ansolabehere et al. 2008). 
 
The significant effect of dissatisfaction with the economy suggests the relevance of 
sociotropic economic evaluations for political attitudes (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007), whereas 
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the significant effect of dissatisfaction with the government, can be interpreted either as an 
accountability effect (citizens are unsatisfied with the poor performance of the government) or a 
partisanship effect (citizens are critical of the new government because it excludes their preferred 
party from power). 
 
 Finally, the variable measuring distrust in political parties is highly significant, indicating 
that, a one unit increase in distrust is associated with a 0.44 increase in anti-establishment attitudes, 
holding all other predictors constant. The large coefficient size is not surprising, since the variables 
distrust in parties and anti-establishment attitudes are highly correlated and intuitively related. 
Nevertheless, as the factor analysis has shown, the two indicators do not load on the same factor 
score, nor are they perfectly correlated. As such, political distrust appears to be a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition for anti-establishment attitudes. To conclude, even after accounting for socio-
demographic characteristics and alternative explanations, occupational unemployment risk still has 
a significant and positive effect, suggesting that labor market outsiders are more likely to endorse 
anti-establishment attitudes. Based on these grounds, hypothesis 1 is confirmed.  
 
In the remainder of this section I conduct a series of robustness checks for Model 3 (including 
the whole set of predictors plus country fixed effects). A residuals plot, as well as a quantile 
normality plot for residuals show that residuals are approximately normally distributed, satisfying 
the assumptions of ordinary least square regression (Figures A, B in the Appendix). The variance 
inflation factors for the independent variables in the equation indicate no signs of multicollinearity 
between predictors (mean VIF = 2.64). Finally, Models 1 and 3 return linearized standard errors 
which are robust to heteroscedasticity i.e., non-constant error variance, which is typical for survey 
data due to unequal sampling probability. However, in addition to being unequally distributed, the 
error terms may also be clustered within countries. Clustering standard errors relaxes the 
independence assumption26, yet the method is also sensitive to the number of clusters, significantly 
increasing the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when the number of groups is below 50 
(Cameron and Miller 2014, p.341). For comparison purposes, I rerun Model 3 with clustered 
standard errors (at the country level) but recommend that the reader should keep in mind that the 
model is not appropriate for such a small number of clusters (Model 3c). Moreover, the model is 
unable to jointly test the significance of the entire set of regression coefficients, since it runs out of 
degrees of freedom (the number of clusters is significantly smaller than the number of predictors). 
In Model 3c the coefficient of occupation-outsiderness is still statistically significant at the p=0.01 
                                                 
26
 Williams, R. (2015). Heteroscedasticity. University of Notre Dame. Available from: 
https://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/stats2/l25.pdf (last accessed 13.05.2017).  
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(see Table 1a in the Appendix).  
 
 
7. Testing Hypothesis 2: Are labor market outsiders more likely to endorse anti-establishment 
attitudes as the distance between the two largest Left and Right parties decreases?  
 
I test hypothesis 2 by including two interaction items of occupation outsiderness with party 
distance on the GALTAN and economic dimensions into the full equation model with predictors 
and country fixed effects (Model 4 below). I remind the reader that I recoded the party distance 
variables so that a higher value means a smaller distance that is, more convergence. For robustness 
checks I run Model 4 with the Bartlett factor and the coarse factor as dependent variables (see 
Models 4a and 4b, Table 2). 
 
 
 
Table 2. Linear Regression with Linearized Standard Errors and Probability Weights  
 Scores for anti-establishment attitudes  
Model 4 Model 4a Model 4b 
Refined factor score  
(OLS method) 
Refined factor score  
(Bartlett method) 
Coarse factor score  
(indicators weighted by 
factor score coefficients) 
Occupation-based outsiderness 
(occupational unemployment risk) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
-0.12 
(0.07) 
-0.09 
(0.05) 
Outsiderness*Convergence 
GALTAN 
0.12* 
(0.06) 
0.16* 
(0.07) 
0.12* 
(0.06) 
Outsiderness* Convergence 
Economic Left-Right  
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Country’s cultural life 
undermined by immigration 
0.20*** 
(0.06) 
0.24*** 
(0.03) 
0.20*** 
(0.02) 
EU unification has already gone 
too far 
0.16*** 
(0.02) 
0.20*** 
(0.03) 
0.17*** 
(0.02) 
Dissatisfaction with the national 
government 
0.35*** 
(0.03) 
0.43*** 
(0.04) 
0.35*** 
(0.03) 
Dissatisfaction with the national 
economy 
0.20*** 
(0.03) 
0.26*** 
(0.04) 
0.21*** 
(0.03) 
Distrust in political parties 0.44*** 
(0.01) 
0.54*** 
(0.01) 
0.45*** 
(0.01) 
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Same socio-demographic as in 
Model 3 characteristics included 
Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.72*** 
(0.16) 
3.33*** 
(0.20) 
2.73*** 
(0.16) 
Observations 15017 15017 15017 
R2 0.5 0.504 0.504 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
Tables displaying coefficients and standard errors for the full set of socio-demographic predictors and countries are 
available from the author on request.  
 
7.2. Results  
 
The interaction between unemployment risk and convergence on the economic dimension is 
insignificant regardless of factor score estimation, yet the interaction between unemployment risk 
and convergence on the GALTAN dimension is positive and significant at p<0.05. These results are 
consistent across all three factor estimation methods (Table 2). The effect of the interaction item 
suggests a conditional relationship between occupation-based outsiderness and party convergence 
on the cultural dimension. In other words, when party convergence is 0, a one unit increase in 
occupational unemployment risk is associated with a 0.12 increase on the anti-establishment 
attitudes scale. Alternatively, for respondents with 0 occupational unemployment risk, a 1 unit 
increase in party convergence is associated with a 0.12 increase on the anti-establishment attitudes 
scale.  
 
Figure 8 displays the effect of unemployment risk on anti-establishment attitudes, conditional 
on party convergence. As expected, one can observe a gradual increase in predicted anti-
establishment attitudes as party convergence scores get closer to 1.  Moreover, Denmark, Sweden 
and Finland are the countries where the convergence score on GALTAN is closest to 1, enhancing 
the effect of labor market outsiderness on opposition to the political establishment. This finding 
corroborates previous research on the effect of party competition on opportunity structures for 
radical right parties. For example, Spies and Franzman (2011) find that mainstream party 
convergence on the cultural dimension has a significant effect on the electoral success of radical 
right parties, whereas the effect of convergence on the economic dimension is insignificant. 
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Likewise, Loxbo (2014) finds a significant and positive effect of Swedish citizens’ perceived 
convergence between mainstream parties with regard to immigration policy on the electoral success 
of the radical right party, Sweden Democrats.  
 
At the opposite pole is Switzerland, where the mainstream parties are extremely polarized on 
the cultural dimension, seemingly reversing the effect of labor market disadvantage on anti-
establishment attitudes. This finding corroborates Lupu’s (2014) argument that polarization 
increases the social identity effects of political parties. In addition, Switzerland is a special case, 
with its largest right party (Swiss People’s Party) taking on more extreme right positions on the 
cultural dimension in comparison to the other Swiss parties (Thompson 2014, p.242). In fact, Spies 
and Franzmann (2011, p.1051) argue that the Swiss People’s Party is difficult to separate from the 
extreme radical right party itself. Therefore, the distance between the Swiss People’s party and the 
largest social democratic party may stimulate social identity effects especially among labor market 
outsiders, who are more likely to endorse anti-immigration and pro-nationalist rhetoric (Ortega and 
Polavieja 2012, O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006, Mayda 2006).  
 
Figure8. Predicted scores for anti-establishment attitudes when occupation outsiderness interacts with party 
convergence on GALTAN. The dependent variable is the refined factor score computed with OLS method. 
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Finally, I respecify Model 4 by clustering the standard errors at the country level, in order to 
compare the results with the ones in Models 4a-4c obtained by survey setting the data (Model 4d in 
Table 2b, Appendix). The new model with clustered standard errors yields a positive, but 
statistically insignificant effect of the interaction between outsiderness and party convergence on 
GALTAN, as the p-value increases slightly over the accepted level of p=0.05. Nevertheless, given 
the low number of clusters, it is doubtful that such a model is appropriate in the first place 
(Cameron and Miller 2014). In addition, the clustered errors model is not able to test all coefficients 
at ones since the number of predictors relative to the number of countries causes the model to run 
out of degrees of freedom. At the same time, the fixed effects model prefixed by the svy command 
already accounts for clustering at the country level and unequal error variance (Huang 2016). 
Consequently, I only present the results from the clustered errors model for transparency purposes, 
and conclude that Model 4 provides qualified support for Hypothesis 2b. 
 
 
8. Discussion  
 
This thesis provides qualified support for the exclusion hypothesis in the insider-outsider 
divide literature. As Rueda (2005) suggested in his influential paper on insider-outsider politics in 
advanced industrial democracies, labor market outsiders are indeed more likely to oppose 
mainstream politics. However, the hypothesis does not hold when labor market disadvantage is 
operationalized as Rueda had originally intended, namely as fixed-term or temporary contracts 
(2005, p.63). One possible explanation is the argument that temporary employment is too 
ephemeral an economic condition to have an impact on workers’ political preferences (Häusermann 
and Schwander 2013), although as Marx (2016, p.104) points out, only a fraction of the workforce 
actually transitions into stable employment. From this perspective, current employment status may 
be able to predict political preferences, yet its effect may be mediated by workers’ prospects for 
upward mobility (Marx 2016), and implicitly by education and skills. In other words, if workers do 
not expect their employment status to improve in time, then they may turn against the political 
establishment. In a similar vein, workers with higher education and skills may consider their fixed-
term contract to be only a temporary step before stable employment, and have no job-status related 
reason to turn against the political establishment.  
 
Rather than limited employment contracts, occupational unemployment risk is arguably a 
more reliable predictor of political preferences and attitudes, since individuals are nested in specific 
social and occupational groups, which shape political preferences and expectations about future 
42 
 
labor market risks (Häusermann and Schwander 2013, Kitschelt and Rehm 2014, Rehm 2011, 
2009). Accordingly, this thesis has demonstrated that labor market disadvantage, defined as 
occupational unemployment risk, is indeed associated with anti-political establishment attitudes, 
thus providing qualified support for the exclusion hypothesis. This occupation-based 
operationalization resembles the one created by Häusermann and Schwander (2013) in that it is 
continuous and can be interpreted as “degrees of outsiderness”. At the same time, in contrast to 
employment contracts, occupational unemployment risk is not directly related to specific, legally 
defined benefits, which mark the line between insiders and outsiders. While anyone may lose their 
job at some point throughout their lives, not everyone falls on the same social security net, and 
outsiders fall harder than insiders. Drawing on labor market segmentation theory, a more accurate 
definition of outsiderness must include two additional dimensions that capture the extent of social 
protection, but also the chances of employment recovery and upward mobility individuals can 
expect after losing their job (see Dancygier and Walter 2015). For this reason, it is necessary to 
account for institutional differences when explaining the micro-foundations of labor market 
outsiders’ political behavior. Future research should further examine how this relationship varies by 
the type of welfare regime, in addition to labor market policy reforms (Rueda 2005).   
 
Regarding the demand-side of the exclusion hypothesis, this thesis finds qualified support 
only for the hypothesis that party convergence on the cultural dimension enhances outsiders’ anti-
establishment attitudes. Contrary to previous theoretical expectations, labor market outsiders are 
not more likely to turn against mainstream politics when parties converge on the economic 
dimension. While previous research on radical right voting reached similar conclusions (Loxbo 
2014, Spies and Franziman 2011, Arzheimer and Carter 2006), this finding is nevertheless 
puzzling. As scholars have argued, both left and right parties tended to promote pro-insider labor 
market reforms, at the expense of outsiders (e.g., Palier and Thelen 2010, Rueda 2005), so why are 
outsiders not responding to parties misrepresenting their economic interests? One possible 
explanation is that party convergence on the economic left-right dimension, associated with a 
decline in class voting, decreased the salience of economic issues (Loxbo 2014, Evans and Tilley 
2012). Moreover, economic left-right depolarization may moderate the effect of cultural 
depolarization by creating an opportunity structure for radical right parties to bring non-economic 
issues such as immigration or globalization in the public’s attention (Spies and Franzmann 2011). 
Therefore, as Spies and Franzmann (2011, p.1061) emphasize, future research should investigate 
the interaction of both ideological dimensions to understand the role party competition plays in 
structuring political behavior.  
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Going back to the significant interaction between party convergence on the cultural 
dimension and occupational unemployment risk, this finding corroborates previous research 
stressing the relevance of party competition on non-economic issues (Loxbo 2014, Spies and 
Franzmann 2011, Meguid 2008, Ignazi 1993) and is supported by theories of labor market 
competition. Accordingly, respondents with low levels of human capitals i.e., education and skills, 
are more likely to oppose immigration, which they perceive as a threat to their employment status 
(Ortega and Polavieja 2012, O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006, Mayda 2006). Furthermore, low human 
capital is also associated with skill specificity i.e., non-portable skills across occupations, and 
therefore with higher risks of unemployment or income loss (Iversen and Soskice’s 2001). 
Moreover, exposure to job offshorability and internationalization of labor competition with foreign 
born citizens, prompt workers with low skills to oppose immigration and economic opening 
(Dancygier and Walter 2015). From this perspective, workers in occupations with higher 
unemployment may be more likely to endorse anti-establishment attitudes when the distance 
between mainstream parties on GALTAN issues is low, leaving room for radical right parties to 
raise the salience of cultural issues, and this effect appears to be mediated by human capital and 
social insurance institutions (Dancygier and Walter 2015).  
 
Another potential avenue for future research is to replicate this thesis with better data. Ideally, 
I would study the relationship between labor market disadvantage and anti-establishment attitudes 
with panel data, which allows to track the effect of the independent variable over time, and with a 
bigger number of countries, to ensure external validity beyond the group of European advanced 
democracies. In addition, although respondents have been found able to accurately detect 
polarization in the party system (Lupu 2014), an even more efficient way to examine the effect of 
party distance on attitudes would have been to operationalize the variable as respondents’ 
perceptions of polarization, following Loxbo’s (2014) study of party convergence and electoral 
support for Sweden Democrats. Rather than relying on expert evaluations of party distance, 
measuring party polarization directly at the individual level alleviates concerns of ecological 
fallacy. Therefore, a cross-sectional survey with repeated rounds with an extended set of questions 
tapping both into feelings about the political establishment, and assessing voters’ perceptions of 
party policy positions would enhance both the internal and external validity of this analysis.  
 
These shortcomings notwithstanding, this thesis has shown that the insider-outsider divide 
can function as a common framework integrating both demand- and supply-side explanations of 
political attitudes. Moreover, by drawing on the literatures on populism and radical right party 
support, this thesis has reconfirmed the relevance of more obvious explanations of anti-
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establishment attitudes. Particularly, political values expressed as agreement with the statements 
that a country’s culture is undermined by immigration, and the European integration has gone too 
far, seem to have a large and positive effect on anti-establishment attitudes, suggesting that value 
orientations play an important role in citizens’ evaluations of mainstream politics. These results 
also indirectly corroborate Karlsen and Aardal’s (2016) recent paper in which values structure 
political behavior by determining the set of acceptable party alternatives a voter can choose from. 
From this perspective, it appears that extreme value orientations could be associated with an empty 
set of (mainstream) party choices, at least from the mainstream political menu, although future 
research should establish to what extent this effect is inflated by issue salience.  
 
Furthermore, the high effect of dissatisfaction with the economy on anti-establishment 
attitudes suggests that voters base their evaluations of the political system on sociotropic rules, 
which confirms previous research in political economy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007). Another 
interesting finding is that respondents feeling close to a radical right party were not more likely to 
endorse anti-establishment attitudes once dissatisfaction with government and the economy were 
controlled for. This indicates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, opposition to mainstream 
politics and radical right party affiliation are not directly connected, but mediated by economic 
evaluations and government critique. Specifically, it shows that anti-establishment attitudes are not 
the mere product of the anti-establishment propaganda of the radical right, but a function of 
prospective and sociotropic evaluations, value orientations and general political and institutional 
distrust. More importantly, distrust in politicians and distrust in parties, and indicators of anti-
establishment attitudes do not appear to be determined by the same underlying latent construct. 
Instead, the two sets of indicators suggest two correlated but empirically distinct attitudinal 
measures, which confirms the argument in the literature on radical right voting that political trust is 
not sufficient to account for all the variation in public forms of political discontent in Western 
Europe (Norris 2005).  
 
Lastly, I have shown that anti-establishment attitudes can be operationalized as a latent factor, 
yet future research needs to investigate the relationship between latent anti-establishment 
predispositions and manifest forms of opposition politics, in order to answer the bigger questions of 
dealignment and electoral volatility. For instance, drawing on Emmenegger et al. (2015), one 
concrete research task would be to untangle the mechanisms underlying participation and party 
choice, by studying the interaction of anti-establishment attitudes with external and/internal 
political efficacy. Another research question is related to the potential of anti-establishment 
attitudes for political change, which, may manifest itself in both conventional and non-conventional 
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forms of political participation, e.g., protest or boycotts. More specifically, the association between 
labor market disadvantage and anti-establishment attitudes can be understood as a form of 
contentious politics, insofar as labor market outsiders in advanced industrial democracies bear a 
latent political leverage over the established elites. According to the political process model of 
social movements (McAdam 1982, pp.39-40), excluded groups possess at all times the latent 
capacity to alter the status-quo by social insurgency and the manifestation of this latent potential is 
contingent, among other factors, on political opportunity structures. Alternatively, wide-spread 
public discontent can give raise to political opportunity structures for challenger parties, 
legitimizing their anti-establishment claims. A final thought on this matter is that anti-establishment 
attitudes are partly fueled by insider-outsider politics, which ultimately pertains to a representation 
problem with vast consequences for the political system. The transformation of European political 
systems eventually depends on how political elites will handle the insider-outsider representation 
dilemma, as well as on potential coalitions between different sections of the workforce. In this 
regard, the way forward seems to start at the junction of demand- and supply-side theories of 
political behavior with theories of institutional change.  
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A. Abbreviations, coding sources 
 
 
Table B. Coding sources of all variables included in the analysis.  
Variable labels Observations Mean Standard  
Deviation 
Min Max Description Source 
Dependent Variables 
Refined Anti-political 
establishment attitudes 
(Factor score with OLS) 
19,170 6.535362 2.258919 0 10.771
05 
Predicted factor score with 
ordinary least squares procedure, 
after factor analysis. Maximizes 
the validity of the factor score 
estimate. 
ESS 7 
(2014) 
Refined Anti-political 
establishment attitudes  
(Bartlett score) 
19,170 8.01 2.78 0 13.21 Predicted factor score with the 
Bartlett method (maximum 
likelihood estimation). Yields an 
unbiased estimate of the true 
factor. 
ESS 7 
(2014) 
Coarse anti-political 
establishment attitudes 
(Averaged sum of items) 
19,170 6.06 2.05 0 10 Averaged sum of the variables 
loading on the retained factor, 
after factor analysis. 
ESS 7 
(2014) 
Indicator-variables for refined factor score and coarse factor score (approximate names due to space constraints) 
No influence on political 
system. 
19,874  
6.029888 
 
2.539719 
 10 Recoded after psppipl to measure 
the inverse of the original 
statement. 
ESS 7 
(2014) 
No say in what 
government does.  
19,859  6.099602 2.490216 0 10 Recoded after psppsgv to measure 
the inverse of the original 
statement. 
ESS 7 
(2014) 
Politicians don’t care 
what people think.  
19,960 6.259519 2.42777 0 10 Recoded after ptcpplt to measure 
the inverse of the original 
ESS 7 
(2014) 
Table A. List of country name abbreviations 
AT Austria FR France DK Denmark GB Great Britain NL Netherlands 
CH Switzerland DE Germany FI Finland IE Ireland SE Sweden 
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statement. 
Hard to take part in 
politics. 
 19,719 5.950707 2.654822  0 10 Recoded after etapapl to measure 
the inverse of the original 
statement. 
ESS 7 
(2014) 
Independent Variables: Individual Level 
Occupation-outsiderness 18,731 4.554266 3.592838  .6 21.36 Occupational unemployment rate, 
computed for each selected 
country, after the formula:  
Unemployment rate in occupation 
J=[(nr. unemployed in J)/(nr. 
unemployed in j + nr. employed 
in J)]x100 (Rehm 2009, p.875). 
EU-LFS 
(2013) 
Lfsa_ugpis 
Lfsa_egais 
 
 
Status-outsiderness 16,639 - - - - Type of contract, recode of 
contrtype : limited + no contract 
= outsider; unlimited contract = 
insider.  
ESS 7 
(2014) 
Independent Variables: Country Level 
Party convergence 
Economic Left-Right 
20,242 0.7924387 0.2644384 0 1 Difference in Economic Left-
Right position between the two 
largest parties in a political 
system. The variable has been 
rescaled to take values from 0 
(min divergence) to 1(max 
convergence).  
CHES 2014 
 
Party convergence  
GALTAN 
20,242 .7087168 .2365226  0 1 Difference in Economic Left-
Right position between the two 
largest parties in a political 
system. The variable has been 
rescaled to take values from 0 
(min divergence) to 1(max 
convergence).  
CHES 2014 
  
Independent Variables: Socio-structural factors 
Gender 20,242 - - - - 1=Male 2=Female ESS 7 
(2014) 
Age (cut at 40) 20,242 - - - - Recode of agea:  
0=Older than 40  
1=Younger than 40 
ESS 7 
(2014) 
Education 20,242  - - 1 7 Recode of eisced, maintains the 
levels of the original variable27. 
ESS 7 
(2014) 
Income (deciles) 17,609  5.371287 2.839834  1 0 Household’s total net income 
from all sources, in deciles.  
ESS 7 
(2014) 
Migrant 20,237 - - - - Recode of brncntr (Respondent ESS 7 
                                                 
27
 The original variable eisced represents the international standard classification of education (ISCED): 1 - Less 
than secondary, 2-lower secondary, 3-lower tier upper secondary, 4-upper tier upper secondary, 5-advanced vocational, 
6-lower tertiary education, 7-higher tertiary education.  
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born in country): 
0=Native 
1=Migrant 
(2014) 
Non-union membership 20,161  - - - - Recode of mbtru (Trade union 
membership):  
1=Yes (currently + previously) 
0=No 
ESS 7 
(2014) 
Independent variables: Alternative explanations 
Country’s cultural life 
Undermined or enriched 
by immigration  
 19,901  - - 0 2 Recode of imueclt so that a higher 
value measures anti-immigration 
sentiment:  
0=(Cultural life enriched) 
1=(Neutral) 
2=(Cultural life undermined) 
ESS 7 
(2014) 
EU unification go 
further or gone too far 
19,388  - - 0 2 Recode of euftf so that a higher 
value measures anti-EU 
sentiment:  
0=(Unification go further) 
1=(Neutral) 
2=(Unification too far) 
ESS 7 
(2014) 
Gays and lesbians to live 
as they wish 
20,242  - - 0 2 Recode of freehms so that a 
higher value captures 
disagreement:  
0=(Agree strongly+Agree) 
1=(Neither agree nor disagree) 
2=(Disagree, disagree strongly, 
refusal + don’t know + refusal) 
ESS 7 
(2014) 
Dissatisfaction with the  
economy 
19,942  - - 0 4 Recode of stfeco so that a higher 
value captures dissatisfaction. 
Categories ordered from 0 (no 
dissatisfaction) to 4(max 
dissatisfaction).  
ESS 7 
(2014) 
Dissatisfaction with the 
national government 
19,707 - - 0 4 Recode of stfeco so that a higher 
value captures dissatisfaction. 
Categories ordered from 0 (no 
dissatisfaction) to 4(max 
dissatisfaction).  
ESS 7 
(2014) 
Distrust in political 
parties 
19,908  - - 0 10 Recode of stfeco so that a higher 
value captures distrust Categories 
ordered from 0 (no distrust) to 
10(max distrust).  
ESS 7 
(2014) 
Feel close to a radical 
right party 
20,242 - - 0 1 Dummy variable created by 
counting how many times a 
radical right party28 was the 
answer to the question “Do you 
feel close to a political party in 
particular?”  
0 = no (the respondent did not 
answered that question by 
ESS 7 
(2014) 
                                                 
28
 CHES (199-2014) is the coding source for radical right parties, except for Switzerland. See the sources 
below, in the Appendix.  
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marking a radical right parties)  
1 = yes (the respondent answered 
by marking a radical right party) 
NB1: The original names of the ESS 7 (2014) variables are written in italics.  
NB2: Binary and categorical variables have no mean therefore the corresponding cells are left empty. For binary variables, the min and the 
max are simply the values the variable takes on.  
NB3: For the complete names of the factor indicator variables, please see Figure 1.  
 
 
 
Table C. Coding sources of occupational unemployment risk. All values are obtained from Eurostat’s Labor Force Surveys (2013), 
unless otherwise noted. The units are expressed in thousand.  
Austria Employment by occupation 
[lfsa_egais] 
Unemployment by previous 
occupation [lfsa_ugpis] 
Resulting occupational 
unemployment rate (Rehm 
2009)29 
Managers 176.3 5.1 2.81 
Professionals 653.6 15.6 2.33 
Technicians and  
associated professionals 
781.9 23.5 2.91 
Clerical support workers 419.1 19.4 4.42 
Service and sales workers 720.0 49.1 6.38 
Skilled agricultural, forestry, 
fishery workers 
162.7 5.730 3.38 
Craft and related trade workers 546.2 29.9 5.19 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 
233.0 14.8 5.97 
Elementary occupations 326.9 36.9 10.14 
Denmark Employment by occupation 
[lfsa_egais] 
Unemployment by previous 
occupation [lfsa_ugpis] 
Resulting occupational 
unemployment rate (Rehm 2009) 
Managers 49.8 4.4 (lfsa_ugpis 2010) 8.11 
Professionals 697.2 22.5 3.12 
Technicians and  
associated professionals 
445.1 18.8 4.05 
                                                 
29
 Unemployment rate in occupation j=[Unemployed in occupation j/ (Unemployed in occupation j + Employed 
in occupation j)]x100.  
30
 Source: Arbeitsmarktdaten online (2013), Arbeitslose nach Berufen (AL301), available from 
iambweb.ams.or.at/ambw (accessed 8.5.2017). 
59 
 
Clerical support workers 192.2 14.5 7.01 
Service and sales workers 529.8 43.2 7.53 
Skilled agricultural, forestry, 
fishery workers 
52.1 2.2 4.05 
Craft and related trade workers 233.2 15.2 6.11 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 
143.1 13.0 8.32 
Elementary occupations  
267.4 
32.1 10.71 
Germany Employment by occupation 
[lfsa_egais] 
Unemployment by previous 
occupation [lfsa_ugpis] 
Resulting occupational 
unemployment rate (Rehm 2009) 
Managers 1,666.2 32.1 1.89 
Professionals 6,439.7 115.8 1.76 
Technicians and  
associated professionals 
8,531.7 168.3 1.93 
Clerical support workers 5,176.7 214.4 3.97 
Service and sales workers 5,510.4 326.7 5.59 
Skilled agricultural, forestry, 
fishery workers 
540.4 25.3 4.47 
Craft and related trade workers 5,103.2 280.1 5.2 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 
2,324.8 129.4 5.27 
Elementary occupations 3,115.4 308.0 8.99 
Finland Employment by occupation 
[lfsa_egais] 
Unemployment by previous 
occupation [lfsa_ugpis] 
Resulting occupational 
unemployment rate (Rehm 2009) 
Managers 67.4 4.7 (lfsa_ugpis 2010) 6.51 
Professionals 561.2 15.3 2.65 
Technicians and  
associated professionals 
445.3 12.9 2.81 
Clerical support workers 159.2 8.0 4.78 
Service and sales workers 468.6 26.0 5.25 
60 
 
Skilled agricultural, forestry, 
fishery workers 
79.7 4.1 4.89 
Craft and related trade workers 271.9 18.8 6.46 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 
183.6 10.5 5.41 
Elementary occupations 152.6 18.2 10.65 
France Employment by occupation 
[lfsa_egais] 
Unemployment by previous 
occupation [lfsa_ugpis] 
Resulting occupational 
unemployment rate (Rehm 2009) 
Managers 1,740.4 36.7 2.06 
Professionals 4,345.4 87.2 1.96 
Technicians and  
associated professionals 
5,222.2 145.1 2.7 
Clerical support workers 2,349.4 95.8 3.91 
Service and sales workers 4,198.4 208.3 4.72 
Skilled agricultural, forestry, 
fishery workers 
823.8 32.0 3.73 
Craft and related trade workers 2,232.6 113.6 4.84 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 
1,817.2 128.1 6.58 
Elementary occupations 2,540.1 171.0 6.3 
Ireland Employment by occupation 
[lfsa_egais] 
Unemployment by previous 
occupation [lfsa_ugpis] 
Resulting occupational 
unemployment rate (Rehm 2009) 
Managers 139.9 9.3 6.23 
Professionals 409.8 15.8 3.71 
Technicians and  
associated professionals 
197.0 16.9 7.9 
Clerical support workers 184.8 19.2 9.41 
Service and sales workers 362.7 41.9 10.35 
Skilled agricultural, forestry, 
fishery workers 
73.0 3.1 4.07 
Craft and related trade workers 175.9 47.8 21.36 
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Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 
103.6 15.8 13.23 
Elementary occupations 163.7 35.3 17.73 
The Netherlands Employment by 
occupation [lfsa_egais] 
Unemployment by 
previous occupation 
[lfsa_ugpis] 
Resulting occupational 
unemployment rate (Rehm 2009) 
Managers 554.4 4.7 0.84 
Professionals 1,939.2 11.9 0.6 
Technicians and  
associated professionals 
1,285.7 12.0 0.92 
Clerical support workers 792.8 13.6 1.68 
Service and sales workers 1,538.4 16.7 1.07 
Skilled agricultural, forestry, 
fishery workers 
144.5 No alternative sources 
available.  
Missing. 
Craft and related trade workers 670.0 11.4 1.67 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 
315.2 4.9 1.53 
Elementary occupations 711.2 6.7 0.93 
Sweden Employment by 
occupation [lfsa_egais] 
Unemployment by 
previous occupation 
[lfsa_ugpis] 
Resulting occupational 
unemployment rate (Rehm 2009) 
Managers 262.4 5.1 1.9 
Professionals 1,160.2 27.7 2.33 
Technicians and  
associated professionals 
776.5 28.8 3.57 
Clerical support workers 270.3 19.3 6.66 
Service and sales workers 933.2 85.4 8.38 
Skilled agricultural, forestry, 
fishery workers 
69.8 6.8 8.87 
Craft and related trade workers 456.0 29.6 6.09 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 
350.5 29.7 7.81 
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Elementary occupations 235.9 42.0 15.11 
Switzerland Employment by occupation 
[lfsa_egais] 
Unemployment by previous 
occupation [lfsa_ugpis] 
Resulting occupational 
unemployment rate (Rehm 2009) 
Managers 355.2 7.9 2.17 
Professionals 1,040.1 19.6 1.59 
Technicians and  
associated professionals 
805.0 15.5 1.88 
Clerical support workers 401.9 9.2 2.23 
Service and sales workers 683.1 24.4 3.44 
Skilled agricultural, forestry, 
fishery workers 
124.3 1.1 0.87 
Craft and related trade workers 552.0 15.2 2.67 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 
159.5 6.3 3.79 
Elementary occupations 175.3 5.1 2.82 
United Kingdom Employment by 
occupation [lfsa_egais] 
Unemployment by 
previous occupation 
[lfsa_ugpis] 
Resulting occupational 
unemployment rate (Rehm 2009) 
Managers 3,058.4 45.2 1.45 
Professionals 7,086.5 97.2 1.35 
Technicians and  
associated professionals 
3,662.7 69.8 1.87 
Clerical support workers 2,826.5 84.6 2.9 
Service and sales workers 5,453.1 175.8 3.12 
Skilled agricultural, forestry, 
fishery workers 
284.9 5.2 1.79 
Craft and related trade workers 2,431.8 67.0 2.68 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 
1,400.6 44.5 3.07 
Elementary occupations 2,548.7 133.7 4.98 
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Table D. Abbreviations of parties included in the analysis  
1. Largest parties to the left of the center in 2014 (selected by seat share in national election most prior to year 2014) 
Party abbreviation Party name (English) Source 
SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany (Germany) CHES 1999-2014 
SD Social Democrats (Denmark) CHES 1999-2014 
PS Socialist Party (France) CHES 1999-2014 
Lab Labour (Ireland) CHES 1999-2014 
PvdA Labour Party (Netherlands) CHES 1999-2014 
Lab Labour Party (United Kingdom) CHES 1999-2014 
SPÖ Social Democratic Party of Austria (Austria) CHES 1999-2014 
SDP Social Democratic Party of Finland (Finland) CHES 1999-2014 
SAP Worker’s Party - Social Democrats (Sweden) CHES 1999-2014 
S Social Democratic Party (Switzerland) https://www.parlament.ch/de/%C3%BCber-
das-parlament/archiv/archiv-fraktionen 
(9.5.2017) 
2. Largest parties to the right of the center in 2014 (selected by seat share in national election most prior to year 2014) 
CDU Christian Democratic Union of Germany (Germany) CHES 1999-2014 
V Venstre, Liberal party of Denmark CHES 1999-2014 
UMP Union for Popular Movement (France) CHES 1999-2014 
FG Family of the Irish (Ireland) CHES 1999-2014 
VVD People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy 
(Netherlands) 
CHES 1999-2014 
Cons Conservative Party (United Kingdom) CHES 1999-2014 
ÖVP Austrian People’s Party (Austria) CHES 1999-2014 
KOK National Coalition Party (Finland) CHES 1999-2014 
M Moderate Party (Sweden) CHES 1999-2014 
V Swiss People’s Party (Switzerland) https://www.parlament.ch/de/%C3%BCber-
das-parlament/archiv/archiv-fraktionen 
(9.5.2017) 
3. Radical right parties in 2014  
NPD National Democratic Party of Germany (Germany) CHES 1999-2014 
DF Danish People’s Party (Denmark) CHES 1999-2014 
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FN National Front (France) CHES 1999-2014 
MPF Movement for France (France) CHES 1999-2014 
SF We Ourselves (Ireland) O’Malley (2008) 
PVV Party for Freedom (Netherlands) CHES 1999-2014 
UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party (United 
Kingdom) 
CHES 1999-2014 
BZÖ Alliance for the Future of Austria (Austria) CHES 1999-2014 
FPÖ Freedom Party of Austria (Austria) CHES 1999-2014 
PS True Finns (Finland) CHES 1999-2014 
SD Sweden Democrats (Sweden) CHES 1999-2014 
 
 
 
Table D. Main Left-Right party positions (Source: CHES 2014) and computed party distance. 
Country 
Main Left-Right Parties 
Policy Dimensions 
Economic Left-Right GAL/TAN 
Denmark 
V 7.30 5.70 
SD 3.90 5.20 
Party distance 3.40 0.50 
Germany 
CDU 5.92 6.00 
SPD 3.50 4.15 
Party distance 2.42 1.85 
France 
UMP 7.33 7.17 
PS 3.83 3.36 
Party distance 3.50 3.80 
Ireland 
FG 7.13 6.38 
Lab 4.13 3.75 
Party distance 3.00 2.63 
Netherlands 
PvdA 3.22 3.00 
VVD 8.33 5.13 
Party distance -5.11 -2.13 
United 
Kingdom 
CONS 7.86 6.14 
LAB 3.86 3.43 
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Anti-partyism  
Rejection of traditional 
governing parties  
+ “Elite vs. the people” 
Anti-political  
establishment 
rhetoric 
+ People centrism Populism 
Figure 1: The relationship between anti-partyism, anti-establishment rhetoric and populism.  
Party distance 4.00 2.71 
Austria 
OVP 6.40 7.20 
SPO 2.80 4.00 
Party distance 3.60 3.20 
Finland 
KOK 8.22 4.75 
SDP 3.44 3.22 
Party distance 4.78 1.53 
Sweden 
M 7.67 4.67 
SAP 3.43 3.62 
Party distance 4.24 1.05 
Switzerland 
SVP/UDC 7.50 9.38 
SP/PS 2.00 1.63 
Party distance 5.50 7.75 
 
B. Figures 
 
 
Figure 2. Indicators of anti-political establishment attitudes (ESS 7) 
Elite vs. the people How much does the political system allow for people like you to have a say in what the government 
does?  
How much does the political system allow for people like you to have an influence on politics? 
How easy do you personally find it to take part in politics? 
Anti-partyism How much politicians care about what people like you think? 
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Figure 4. Recoded variables tapping specific anti-political establishment attitudes (1-4) and political trust (5-6), 
followed by their value labels. 
xnoinflgov Political system does not allow people to have a say in what the government does. 
xnoinflpol Political system does not allow people like you to have an influence on politics. 
xpolitnocare Politicians don’t care what people like you think. 
xhardpartpol How hard is it for you to take part in politics? 
xnotrustparties No confidence in political parties. 
xnotrustpolit  No trust in politicians. 
All items have been formulated in reverse of the original statement.  
 
 
Figure 5: Scale properties of items tapping anti-political establishment attitudes of ESS7 respondents.  
Anti-political establishment attitudes 
Cronbach’s alpha=0.83 
Eigenvalue=2.15 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy=0.79 
Factor Loading32 
  
Uniqueness 
Political system does not allow people to have a say in what government does.  0.76 0.42 
Political system does not allow people like you to have an influence on politics. 0.83 0.32 
 
Politicians do not care what people like you think. 0.73 0.39 
It is hard for you personally to participate in politics. 0.60 0.64 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 Green/Alternative/Libertarian–Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist  
32
After oblique promax rotation.  
Figure 3. Ideological distance between the two main left-right parties and corresponding variables.  
pid_LRecon Ideological distance on the general economic left-right dimension. 
pid_GALTAN Ideological distance on the GAL/TAN dimension31.  
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Figure 6. Histograms of the refined factor score (OLS method) proxying for anti-political establishment 
attitudes. 
 
 
Figure 6a. Histograms of the coarse factor score proxying for anti-political establishment attitudes. 
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Figure 6b. Histograms of the refined Bartlett score proxying for anti-establishment attitudes.  
 
 
Figure A. Model 3 residuals plot  
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Figure B. Model 3 quantile normality plot  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Model 3 predicted probability of endorsing anti-establishment attitudes 
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Figure 8. Model 4 conditional margins plot. Predicted scores for anti-establishment attitudes when occupation 
outsiderness interacts with party convergence on GALTAN.  
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C. Tables  
 
 
Table 1. Ordinary Least Square Regressions with Linearized Standard Errors and Probability Weights Added 
 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 2b Model 3 
Scores for anti-political establishment attitudes (refined factor score OLS) 
Status-based Outsiderness 
 (contract type) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
    
Occupation-based outsiderness  
(occupational unemployment risk) 
 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
Female 0.21*** 
(0.05) 
0.17*** 
(0.05) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
0.13*** 
(0.05) 
0.13*** 
(0.05) 
Age (younger than 40) -0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
   
Age (continuous)  0.01** 
(0.00) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Education (EISCED) 
Lower secondary  
(Base category: Less than lower 
secondary) 
-0.51*** 
(0.11) 
-0.50*** 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
Lower tier upper secondary -0.30** 
(0.10) 
-0.27** 
(0.10) 
0.14 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
Upper tier upper secondary -0.73*** 
(0.12) 
-0.65*** 
(0.11) 
-0.36*** 
(0.09) 
-0.30*** 
(0.08) 
-0.30*** 
(0.08) 
Advanced vocational -0.77*** 
(0.11) 
-0.65*** 
(0.10) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.21** 
(0.08) 
-0.28*** 
(0.08) 
Lower tertiary -1.28*** 
(0.12) 
-1.17*** 
(0.11) 
-0.46*** 
(0.10) 
-0.44*** 
(0.09) 
-0.46*** 
(0.09) 
Higher tertiary -1.41*** 
(0.12) 
-1.24*** 
(0.11) 
-0.57*** 
(0.10) 
-0.60*** 
(0.09) 
-0.65*** 
(0.09) 
Income in deciles 
2d Income decile  
(Base category: 1st Income decile) 
0.13 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
0.06 
(0.10) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
0.10 
(0.09) 
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3d Income decile  
 
-0.05 
(0.12) 
-0.09 
(0.11) 
0.14 
(0.10) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
4th Income decile  
 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.15 
(0.12) 
0.05 
(0.10) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
5th Income decile  
 
-0.24 
(0.12) 
-0.24* 
(0.12) 
-0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.05 
(0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.09) 
6th Income decile  
 
-0.25* 
(0.12) 
-0.24* 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.09) 
7th Income decile  
 
-0.37** 
(0.12) 
-0.38*** 
(0.11) 
-0.06 
(0.10) 
-0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
8th Income decile  -0.41*** 
(0.12) 
-0.42*** 
(0.12) 
-0.04 
(0.10) 
-0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
9th Income decile -0.63*** 
(0.13) 
-0.60*** 
(0.12) 
-0.19 
(0.10) 
-0.14 
(0.09) 
-0.16 
(0.09) 
10th decile -0.89*** 
(0.13) 
-0.80*** 
(0.12) 
-0.27** 
(0.10) 
-0.26** 
(0.09) 
-0.27* 
(0.09)* 
Migrant status -0.22* 
(0.09) 
-0.23** 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
0.19** 
(0.06) 
0.21** 
(0.06) 
Non-union membership  0.41*** 
(0.06) 
0.43*** 
(0.06) 
0.32*** 
(0.05) 
0.17*** 
(0.04) 
0.10* 
(0.05) 
Feeling close to a radical right 
party 
0.38*** 
(0.09) 
0.38*** 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
  
Disagreement: Gays and lesbians 
free to live life as they wish 
  0.06 
(0.04) 
  
Country’s cultural life undermined 
by immigration 
  0.28*** 
(0.03) 
0.19*** 
(0.02) 
0.20*** 
(0.02) 
  EU unification already gone too far   0.26*** 
(0.03) 
0.15*** 
(0.02) 
0.17** 
(0.02)* 
Dissatisfaction with the national 
government 
  0.87*** 
(0.03) 
0.36*** 
(0.03) 
0.35*** 
(0.03) 
Dissatisfaction with the national 
economy 
  0.32*** 
(0.03) 
0.18*** 
(0.03) 
0.21*** 
(0.03) 
Distrust in political parties    0.46*** 
(0.01) 
0.44*** 
(0.01) 
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Country fixed effects No No No No Yes 
Constant 7.40*** 
(0.13) 
7.09*** 
(0.13) 
3.32*** 
(0.14) 
2.25*** 
(0.13) 
2.60*** 
(0.15) 
Observations 14133 15849 15080 15017 15017 
R2 0.095 0.092 0.355 0.494 0.505 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
 
 
 
Table 2. Linear Regression with Linearized Standard Errors and Probability Weights  
 Scores for anti-establishment attitudes  
Model 4 Model 4a Model 4b 
Refined factor score  
(OLS method) 
Refined factor 
score  
(Bartlett method) 
Coarse factor score  
(indicators weighted by 
factor score coefficients) 
Occupation-based outsiderness 
(occupational unemployment risk) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
-0.12 
(0.07) 
-0.09 
(0.05) 
Outsiderness*Convergence GALTAN 0.12* 
(0.06) 
0.16* 
(0.07) 
0.12* 
(0.06) 
Outsiderness* Convergence Economic 
Left-Right  
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Country’s cultural life undermined by 
immigration 
0.20*** 
(0.06) 
0.24*** 
(0.03) 
0.20*** 
(0.02) 
EU unification has already gone too far 0.16*** 
(0.02) 
0.20*** 
(0.03) 
0.17*** 
(0.02) 
Dissatisfaction with the national 
government 
0.35*** 
(0.03) 
0.43*** 
(0.04) 
0.35*** 
(0.03) 
Dissatisfaction with the national economy 0.20*** 
(0.03) 
0.26*** 
(0.04) 
0.21*** 
(0.03) 
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Distrust in political parties 0.44*** 
(0.01) 
0.54*** 
(0.01) 
0.45*** 
(0.01) 
Same socio-demographic as in Model 3 
characteristics included 
Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.72*** 
(0.16) 
3.33*** 
(0.20) 
2.73*** 
(0.16) 
Observations 15017 15017 15017 
R2 0.5 0.504 0.504 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
Tables displaying coefficients and standard errors for the full set of socio-demographic predictors and countries are available 
from the author on request.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1a. Robustness checks for Hypothesis 1 (Model 3) 
 
  
Model 3a (linearized SE) Model 3b (linearized SE) Model 3c (clustered 
SE) 
Scores for anti-establishment attitudes  
Coarse factor score  
(Indicators weighted by factor 
score coefficients) 
Refined factor score  
(Bartlett method) 
Refined factor score  
(OLS method) 
Occupation-based outsiderness  
(occupational unemployment 
risk) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.04** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
Female 0.13*** 
(0.03) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.13** 
(0.03) 
Age  0.001*** 
(0.00) 
0.001*** 
(0.00) 
0.01** 
(0.00) 
Education  
Lower secondary  
(Base category: Less than lower 
secondary) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
-0.07 
(0.11) 
-0.06 
(0.13) 
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Lower tier upper secondary -0.07 
(0.08) 
-0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
Upper tier upper secondary -0.30*** 
(0.09) 
-0.36*** 
(0.10) 
-0.30 
(0.15) 
Advanced vocational -0.28*** 
(0.08) 
-0.33*** 
(0.10) 
-0.28* 
(0.11) 
Lower tertiary -0.46*** 
(0.09) 
-0.55*** 
(0.11) 
-0.46** 
(0.12) 
Higher tertiary -0.65*** 
(0.09) 
-0.79*** 
(0.11) 
-0.65*** 
(0.10) 
Income in deciles 
2d Income decile  
(Base category: 1st Income 
decile) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
0.13 
(0.11) 
0.10 
(0.13) 
3d Income decile  
 
0.09 
(0.09) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
4th Income decile  
 
0.04 
(0.09) 
 
0.05 
(0.11) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
5th Income decile  
 
-0.05 
(0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.11) 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
6th Income decile  
 
0.02 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
7th Income decile  
 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
-0.11 
(0.11) 
-0.09 
(0.03) 
8th Income decile  -0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.13 
(0.11) 
-0.11** 
(0.02) 
9th Income decile -0.16 
(0.09) 
-0.19 
(0.11) 
-0.16** 
(0.04) 
10th decile -0.27** 
(0.09) 
-0.33** 
(0.11) 
-0.27*** 
(0.05) 
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Migrant status 0.21** 
(0.06) 
0.24** 
(0.08) 
0.21 
(0.18) 
Non-union membership  0.10* 
(0.05) 
0.12* 
(0.06) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
Country’s cultural life 
undermined by immigration 
0.20*** 
(0.02) 
0.24*** 
(0.03) 
0.20** 
(0.05) 
  EU unification has already gone 
too far 
0.17*** 
(0.02) 
0.20*** 
(0.03) 
0.17*** 
(0.03) 
Dissatisfaction with the national 
government. 
0.36*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.43*** 
(0.04) 
0.35*** 
(0.03) 
Dissatisfaction with the national 
economy 
0.21*** 
(0.03) 
0.26*** 
(0.04) 
0.21*** 
(0.03) 
Distrust in political parties 0.45*** 
(0.01) 
0.54*** 
(0.01) 
0.44*** 
(0.01) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.60*** 
(0.15) 
3.17*** 
(0.19) 
2.47*** 
(0.17) 
Observations 15017 15017 15017 
R2 0.504 0.504 0.505 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
 
 
 
Table 2b Model 4d (Clustered SE) 
 Scores for anti-establishment attitudes 
Refined factor score (OLS method) 
Occupation-based outsiderness 
(occupational unemployment risk) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
Outsiderness*Convergence GALTAN 0.12 
(0.10) 
Outsiderness* Convergence Economic 
Left-Right  
0.04 
(0.03) 
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Country’s cultural life undermined by 
immigration 
0.20*** 
(0.06) 
EU unification has already gone too far 0.17*** 
(0.03) 
Dissatisfaction with the national government 0.35*** 
(0.03) 
Dissatisfaction with the national economy 0.21*** 
(0.03) 
Distrust in political parties 0.41*** 
(0.01) 
Same socio-demographic as in Model 3 
characteristics included 
Yes 
Country fixed effects included Yes 
Constant  2.69*** 
(0.15) 
Observations 14948 
R
2
 0.520 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
